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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EMPLOYMENT IN AFGHAN CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT COMPANIES \ E. GRAWERT & F. SHIRZAD
Empirical research on private sector companies and their business strategies 
in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCASs) has been rare so far. With the 
aim of identifying the challenges of and motives for conflict-sensitive employ-
ment, this Working Paper presents a qualitative study on construction and 
transport companies in Afghanistan, based on interviews with company own-
ers and employees in 2015 and 2016. The research reveals that companies do in 
fact apply a range of employment strategies with conflict-reducing effects out 
of self-interest. Builders need such strategies for the smooth completion of 
construction and infrastructure projects, while hauliers seek safe passage on 
routes through insecure areas of Afghanistan. These companies hire local peo-
ple and negotiate with elders in communities located around construction 
sites or, respectively, along transport routes in order inter alia to identify local 
needs and, where feasible, satisfy them. The Paper argues that a general policy 
framework for conflict-sensitive employment is futile under conditions of an 
FCAS, which are characterized by a high level of state corruption and a variety 
of local powerholders with different interests and the inclination to extract 
money from companies operating in areas under their control. These insights 
point to a dilemma for development agencies in their pursuit of an agenda to 
create stability by engaging with the private sector. Whereas companies pur-
suing conflict-sensitive employment strategies may help to stabilize local 
communities, they also stabilize local power relations. In Afghanistan, this 
implies co-existence of, and competition between, various powerholders con-
trolling different districts or fighting over their control. Underpinned by micro- 
level data, the study thus contributes meaningfully to the ongoing debate on 
the potential role of the private sector in peacebuilding. It places the scope of 
action and limitations of private sector companies into a realistic perspective. 
The Paper concludes that new Afghan and foreign construction and transport 
companies can learn lessons from experienced companies and apply system-
atic, locally adjusted conflict-sensitive employment frameworks to upcoming 
infrastructure projects. 
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Private construction and transport 
companies may have a conflict- 
reducing employment strategy at the 
local and project level, but as tempo-
rary actors in communities they can-
not assume a peacebuilding role 
Private construction and transport companies 
can have a meaningful impact on local stability if 
they apply conflict-sensitive employment strategies. 
If stability is understood as keeping local power rela-
tions and social cohesion as they are, companies that 
neither exacerbate violence nor widen divisions 
within a community or between communities do 
contribute to stability. The conditions that prevail in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS) appar-
ently require such a modest concept of stability.  
Ambitious normative concepts of stability can only 
be applied if a social contract is upheld between a  
legitimate state, with its monopoly on violence, and 
society. This, however, does not exist either in govern-
ment-held or in non-state armed group (NSAG)-held 
parts of Afghanistan. Beyond this narrow leeway for 
stabilization, there is no evidence of companies hav-
ing an impact on peacebuilding in Afghanistan.
Conflict-sensitive employment is a  
crucial component of conflict-sensitive 
business 
Unemployment exacerbates violence in fragile 
and conflict-affected settings (FCAS), because people 
without jobs not only have less to lose by engaging in 
violence, but often have a comparative advantage in 
doing so. Construction and transport companies can 
employ people in a conflict-sensitive way and contrib-
ute to conflict reduction at the local level of operation 
if they understand the local conflict context and  
dynamics. For company managers and operators, this 
involves building relationships with community lead-
ers and shared understandings of the conflict risks 
and impacts. As violent conflict imposes a range of 
costs on companies, a conflict-sensitive approach to 
doing business—one that seeks to avoid these costs by 
developing locally adjusted conflict management and 
employment strategies—is a strategic choice for com-
pany managers. 
Conflict-sensitive employment as a  
process-oriented approach may change 
labour relations in the long run
Economic liberalization has promoted self- 
employment and the creation of short-term jobs, in 
particular in areas affected by armed conflict, rather 
than establishing permanent employment along 
with strong organizations capable of representing  
labour interests vis-à-vis employers and the state. In 
Afghanistan, labour relations shaped by close family 
and kinship networks prevail in construction and 
transport companies. These arrangements have been 
strengthened because they offer reliability in the 
context of decades of violent conflict. We find that 
companies prefer to employ persons whom they can 
trust due to family ties. However, when they have 
projects within communities, companies tend to 
adapt to the local conditions and hire local people. 
They seek to protect their sites and assets through 
trust-building and the dispensing of income oppor-
tunities and benefits. In this sense, conflict-sensitive 
employment strategy has the effect of changing  
labour relations.
Main findings
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Violent conflicts have affected Afghanistan since 
the late 1970s. Armed conflicts between government 
troops and various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) 
as well as between NSAGs form the environment in 
which domestic construction and transport compa-
nies operate. They are a crucial factor not only for 
building work and transport logistics but indeed for 
any kind of infrastructure project. From the perspec-
tive of entrepreneurs, their business environment is 
characterized by at least three dimensions: 
1\ direct violence affecting the structures of compa-
nies, their projects and the employees,
2\ the lack, or weakly enforced, government policies 
towards the private sector, non-transparent rules 
and regulations and corrupt authorities, 1
3\ a difficult economic environment due to distor-
tions in demand, supply, value chains, invest-
ment and employment. 2
These conditions impinge on various types of 
companies to different degrees. Construction is a capi-
tal-supplying sector whereas transport is part of the 
service sector and, hence, provides transactions like 
any other distributive activity. Economic studies indi-
cate that during civil wars both construction and 
transportation tend to contract more rapidly than 
GDP as a whole (Collier, 1999). However, as a key part of 
the private economic sector, construction and trans-
portation will often continue operating in violence-af-
fected environments as long as investors in resource 
exploitation or foreign interventions require new 
buildings, infrastructure and logistics. Building work 
and the transportation of goods and passengers are 
essential activities and, hence, may be profitable even 
under circumstances of ongoing armed conflict, even 
if on a smaller scale. Construction and transport are 
labour-intensive activities, usually requiring a large 
proportion of unskilled labour, so that these sectors of 
the economy can absorb workers who would other-
wise have very limited prospects of earning an income. 
However, the construction and transport businesses 
1 \  a) and b) were already mentioned by Afghan CIT company owners  
participating in the project’s kick-off workshop in Kabul in March 
2015; cf. also Chene, 2012.
2 \  c) has been elaborated on in numerous academic papers, among them 
Holmes, 2013, Dudwick et al., 2013, Mashal, 2014, Brück et al., 2015, Byrd 
et al., 2016, Ghiasy et al., 2015. Cf. also Grawert et al., 2017.
are less researched, in terms of their performance in a 
context of violent conflict, than agriculture, mining or 
manufacturing. These businesses are therefore well 
worth studying in depth if we want to understand the 
potentials here for reducing violence through conflict- 
sensitive employment (CSE) strategies.
It is widely held that unemployment enhances 
violence in the context of fragile and conflict-affected 
settings (FCAS), because people without jobs not only 
have less to lose by engaging in violence, but actually 
have a comparative advantage in doing so (Hirshleifer, 
2001; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, 2009; Gerstle & 
Meissner, 2010). Thus, one conclusion drawn in the 
literature is that more employment opportunities for 
the jobless can reduce the likelihood that individuals 
will willingly engage in violent activities, assuming 
that the availability of employment increases the  
opportunity cost of getting involved in fighting. How-
ever, equating employment creation with peace 
building would be to oversimplify a highly complex 
relationship. Evidence suggests that the type of jobs 
created is far more important than just having more 
jobs (World Bank, 2012, p. 127), and that employment 
may even exacerbate conflict if it favours one group 
over another in a divided community. Lack of aware-
ness of the potential impact of employment can thus 
contribute to instability and even exacerbate insecu-
rity (Walton, 2010; GIZ & International Alert, 2015). 
Against this backdrop, this paper looks into the po-
tentials for conflict-sensitive employment to be insti-
tuted by construction and transport companies oper-
ating under the difficult conditions of smouldering 
conflict and a resurgence of violence in Afghanistan. 
The Paper tries to answer two main questions based 
on empirical findings from field research in 
Afghanistan:
   \ What induces construction and transport com-
panies to apply conflict-sensitive employment 
strategies?  
   \ What are the challenges hindering companies 
from engaging in conflict-sensitive 
employment?
Introduction
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between domestic companies working on contracts 
with international clients, those providing projects 
for mixed customers and those operating exclusively 
for domestic Afghan clients. This breakdown is rele-
vant because orders by international agencies and 
troops rapidly declined in 2013, after the withdrawal 
of international troops was announced and many aid 
agencies shifted their focus to a new hub in Syria. 
This scaling-down significantly affected those com-
panies that had emerged because of the intervention 
and fully depended on the international customers. 
The resulting market is artificial and cannot be sus-
tained as long as no other large-scale investment  
replaces the investment made by the international 
agencies and troops.
The fifth chapter explores the employment strat-
egies of construction and transport companies, giving 
special consideration to the ways in which these 
strategies impact on stability from a local and com-
pany perspective. This chapter points out how com-
pany owners, managers and employees perceive the 
changes that have been occurring due to economic 
decline and rising insecurity as well as their percep-
tions of possible solutions. 
In the sixth chapter, the study identifies the fac-
tors that drive the development of CSE strategies for 
the private sector as well as those factors that either 
challenge or promote the implementation of this 
strategy. It concludes by considering the outlook for 
CSE in the near future, with an assessment of its po-
tential role and meaning in the CIT sector in 
Afghanistan.
The Paper3 presents a piece of qualitative social 
research as a contribution to a discourse among 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), development 
agencies and international financial institutions on 
the potential role of the private sector in building 
peace or, at least, stability (Naudé, 2007; Brück et al., 
2015; see also Grawert et al., 2017). 
The first chapter presents scholarly insights on 
labour relations and their changes during and in the 
aftermath of violent conflict. It outlines the concept 
of conflict-sensitive employment developed from the 
literature on private sector activities in FCAS as a po-
tential approach to enhance stability through em-
ployment and discusses potential motives for and 
challenges to conflict-sensitive employment. It then 
explains the methodology applied in the research on 
the construction, infrastructure, and transport (CIT) 
sector in Afghanistan and the methods of field research 
and data analysis. 
In order to establish the context in which CIT 
companies operate, the second chapter surveys the 
economic development and business environment in 
Afghanistan for the period following the 2001 mili-
tary intervention, focusing on the role of the govern-
ment and international aid for the economy and em-
ployment. The chapter also highlights the 
deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan 
since 2014 and the characteristics of the business  
environment, and identifies interlinkages between 
these dimensions. 
The third chapter highlights the main character-
istics and developments of the CIT sector and its con-
tribution to employment in Afghanistan. Based on 
findings from interviews with owners and managers 
of a range of construction and transport companies 
in Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar, and Mazar-e Sharif con-
ducted between 2015 and 2017, the fourth chapter fo-
cuses on the views of company owners and managers, 
exploring their assessments of the conflict environ-
ment and the ways in which conflict affects the oper-
ations of their companies. A distinction is made  
 
3 \  We are very grateful to Katja Mielke and the BICC colloquium for 
valuable comments on earlier versions of this Paper. This said, sole res-
ponsibility for the contents and any errors that might have occurred 
lie with the authors.
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Labour relations in fragile and  
conflict-affected settings
Typical for war economies is the prevalence of 
primitive accumulation, i.e. non-economic ways of 
appropriating land and other assets. This accumula-
tion to the benefit of one group means displacement 
for other groups, which will then become dependent 
on support, aid or alms, or have to make distress sales 
of their labour power (Cramer, 2008). Farmers may 
move into trade or join military groups, whilst com-
manders appropriate urban and rural land. Large sec-
tions of the population flee to the towns or abroad, 
where they may stay in refugee camps or become ille-
gal workers, being hired as cheap labour by local em-
ployers in the neighbouring countries where most of 
the displaced people take refuge (cf. Rohani, 2014 and 
Monsutti, 2008, for the case of Afghans in Iran). 
During violent conflict, the nature of business 
changes, turning into arrangements that are pro-
foundly different those in peace times. Businesses 
tend to strive for short-term, often illicit, gains, 
whilst the actors fuse with combatants, with com-
manders of NSAGs or military officers becoming busi-
nessmen (Peschka, 2011). Entrepreneurs face bottle-
necks resulting from the destruction of physical 
infrastructure and the flight of local human and 
financial capital and try to overcome these problems 
by adjusting to the changed market conditions. Mar-
ket competition acquires a combative dimension as 
armed actors dominate certain businesses and twist 
competition with civilian entrepreneurs to their own 
favour. Previously existing economic institutions and 
processes are distorted or restructured so as to func-
tion according to the terms of a war economy (Elwert, 
1999; Schetter, 2002). During the conflict, combatants 
often engage in pillage, predation, extortion and  
deliberate violence against civilians in order to 
acquire control over lucrative assets, capture trade 
networks and diaspora remittances, and exploit la-
bour; (hence) war economies are highly decentralised 
and privatised, both in the means of coercion and in 
the means of production and exchange (Ballentine & 
Nitschke, 2005, p. 2). 
Insights from scholarly research reveal that rela-
tions, institutions and processes put in place before a 
violent conflict will impact strongly on the origin, 
form and trajectory of the conflict. Moreover, the 
social relations and institutions that emerge during a 
violent conflict and the establishment of a war econ-
omy will have a lasting impact on the economy,  
labour relations and restructuring of institutions 
when the violence has subsided. However, more often 
than not, the violence does not fully subside but 
leaves behind a situation marked by precarious and 
insecure conditions that can be characterized as a 
“fragile and conflict-affected setting” (FCAS) (NIMD, 
2016). FCAS are defined as settings in which the polit-
ical environment is extremely polarized and divided 
due to a lack of trust among political actors. FCAS are 
thus characterized by “low social cohesion and a lack 
of consensus on what organising principles should 
determine the contest for state power and how that 
power should be implemented” (NIMD, 2016). 
Violent conflict, or its aftermath, is closely inter-
connected with fragility. In fact, the two phenomena 
have to be considered as mutually reinforcing. 
Whereas FCAS often coincide with state borders, they 
may also be limited to specific areas within a state or 
extend to regions encompassing the borders of several 
states. As FCAS most often have regional and interna-
tional linkages and dimensions, the distrust and  
social divisions, as well as war economies, usually  
extend beyond local or national levels (Grawert, 2010). 
In the context of FCAS, foreign and domestic 
businesses are, or become, inherently part of the “po-
litical marketplace” (Hoffmann, 2014). Entrepreneurs 
and employees have to be aware that they will never 
be perceived as neutral. The assumption that busi-
nesses can operate as non-political agents in highly 
political contexts has been proven wrong (Ganson & 
Wennmann, 2016). Research has revealed that as la-
bour relations vary between different conflicts and 
are further differentiated according to the specific 
dynamics of a conflict, the labour relations will also 
differ within a particular FCAS. An overview of re-
search findings on labour relations in FCAS will clari-
fy the nature of employment conditions that prevail 
in contexts shaped by violent conflict.
Inducements for conflict-sensitive business  
and employment
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resource exploitation, services, construction or trans-
portation), the business strategy (outputs produced 
for foreign or domestic markets, integrated produc-
tion cycles), and the level of exit costs (defined as the 
balance between fixed and mobile assets) (Hameed & 
Mixon, 2013).
The presence of extractive industries, agribusi-
nesses, distributors, security services and other busi-
nesses in FCAS demonstrates that some formal mar-
ket actors are interested in investing in difficult 
environments and have found ways to manage risks 
in these sectors. For bigger companies this frequently 
involves paying private security companies for pro-
tection of their sites or transport routes, which can 
become a substantial cost factor (Shirzad, 2017). Small 
entrepreneurs may manage risks through subsis- 
tence production or small-scale trade (Hameed &  
Mixon, 2013). Economic opportunities rise or fall with 
changes in the flow of military supplies, civilian 
goods supplies and humanitarian aid deliveries, and 
this has a strong impact on employment.
During and after violent conflicts, there is a de-
mand for labour by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) 
and state security forces as well as intervening troops. 
Researchers have observed continuities in labour  
relations between pre-war, war, and post-war condi-
tions including those in FCAS. Employers tend to use 
pre-war methods of recruitment of labour even if the 
new situation has produced a liberal market without 
standards and regulations. In a patronage-based soci-
ety, recruitment favours family and kinship members 
and at a more general level, clienteles of patrons to 
meet specific needs in services, fighting, logistics and 
the reproduction of the labour force engaged in fight-
ing (Cramer, 2008). Labour conditions in wars tend to 
be regulated by force. Two main trajectories determine 
labour relations in armed conflicts: in situations 
where NSAGs have gained hegemony over norms, 
spread ideals or created a collective identity, these 
groups tend to recruit followers and organize warfare 
and its logistics based on social contracts with local 
population groups. They will not commit atrocities 
against these groups and the people whose labour 
they need. Where NSAGs receive funds from abroad 
or through resource rents, they are more likely to 
War economies thus destroy or circumvent the 
formal economy and fuel the growth of informal and 
black markets, “effectively blurring the lines between 
the formal, informal, and criminal sectors and activi-
ties” (Ballentine & Nitschke, 2005, p. 2). War economies 
entail the breakdown of legal structures and law  
enforcement and extend business opportunities into 
spheres that usually are banned by law.
Remnants of the war economy usually survive 
long after peace agreements have been made, new 
governments are in place, and aid flows surge up. 
These remnants shape the economy in FCAS to a  
significant extent in areas that are not under full 
control of the state and even in areas where the state 
has deployed its forces and established governing 
institutions.
Hence, it is not only during violent conflict but 
also in FCAS that we usually find some groups or in-
dividuals taking direct advantage of the power of 
arms to seize property and money, impose dues on 
companies and inhabitants, use forced labour, and 
exert control over trade, assets and natural resources. 
Others prosper by organizing supplies on routes and 
through networks that facilitate trade and contraband 
across borders. Competitiveness depends on the abili-
ty of entrepreneurs to adjust to the violence-driven 
context, which often entails building special relation- 
ships with powerful groups and relying on networks 
of people who can be trusted. Frequently, these are 
family and kinship members and members of the 
same ethnic or other shared identity group. The rela-
tionship between the private sector and society in 
FCAS thus depends on a variety of factors according 
to the structure of the society in which private com-
panies operate. Local businesses tend to become part 
of the existing conflict and fragility context (Killick 
et al., 2005). 
In FCAS, company owners make decisions aimed 
at minimizing the effect of armed violence on their 
operations and activities. Company strategy will be 
influenced by a variety of factors: the magnitude of 
physical assets in specific violence-affected areas (for 
example, large-scale site-specific investments in 
non-movable assets such as roads or buildings), the 
core business of the enterprise (such as natural 
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recruit people with little commitment to the com-
munity in which they are deployed and with only 
fragmented organizational ties, so they will do any 
job for direct payment. In this case, the propensity for 
these recruits to commit atrocities is likely to be high 
(Weinstein, 2007). These patterns tend to remain in 
place under conditions of FCAS.
Violent conflict has a major social impact. It ac-
celerates social differentiation and class formation, 
pushing many people who had previously been small 
farmers into wage labour. In some cases, such as 
South Africa or some Latin American countries, this 
has led to pressure for better labour relations after vi-
olent conflict (Cramer, 2008). Human rights abuses 
against workers prevail during conflicts and forced 
labour is often imposed as punishment; this is likely 
to continue in FCAS, often being imposed by security 
firms. Ex-combatants are specialists in violence and 
continue this role in the wider economy. At the same 
time, and this pertains to Afghanistan, “(t)he post-
war peace is about liberalising markets and importing 
the institutions of capable states and good govern-
ance” (Cramer, 2008, p. 123). This implies promoting 
self-employment, in particular for displaced people 
and demobilized fighters, rather than establishing 
strong organizations capable of representing labour 
interests towards employers and the state. However, 
in cases where changing labour relations have trig-
gered social movements demanding rights, there can 
be a challenge to the power relations embedded in 
the social—and labour—relations and to the macro- 
economic assumptions of donors and international 
finance institutions (Pugh, 2008). 
In his background paper for the World Develop-
ment Report 2013 on ‘Jobs’, Cramer (2010) holds that it 
is often 
the experience of employment – in demeaning and 
monotonous tasks, with little prospect of promotion 
or skills development, in conditions that are often 
openly exploitative and coercive, and for piteously 
little remuneration - just as much as, if not more 
than, unemployment that drive people to participate 
in insurgencies, militias, armies, etc. ( p. 24). 
People may also join armed groups because, apart 
from the absence of alternative work, they offer op-
portunities to escape pressure from families and elders, 
or because participation in fighting has become 
inherent in local dynamics, especially where resent-
ment and envy divide communities. Researchers 
hold that a further reason for engagement in violent 
fighting can be the lack of institutional mechanisms 
through which employees and workers can express 
complaints, demand improved conditions and get 
conflicts resolved (Cramer, 2010). Participation in vio-
lent conflict may also represent a rebellion against 
unjust social orders and a challenge to their legitimacy, 
again indicating that labour markets and labour rela-
tions are important aspects of social orders.
These insights on labour-related factors that can 
increasingly draw groups into participation in vio-
lent conflicts raise the question of whether this per-
spective can be turned round towards to create what 
scholars have called an ‘employment-stability nexus’. 
Moreover, they point to the importance of identifying 
potential motivations towards conflict-sensitive 
business and employment strategies.
Conflict-sensitive employment 
Based on the International Classification of Status 
in Employment (ICSE) of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) (see Annex), the groups in em-
ployment can be defined as:
any engagement in a paid or self-earning position 
outside the public sector in which a material gain or 
service provision is expected as the result of work. It 
includes wage employment as well as self-employ-
ment (NWO/WOTRO, 2014). 
In an endeavour to encourage more research on 
the links between employment and stability, NWO/
WOTRO (2014) has defined stability as: 
the preservation of a social contract that – at state 
level – reflects perceptions of legitimacy, adequate 
service provision, the monopoly over legitimate use of 
force, and the capacity to mediate non-violent ex-
pressions of grievance, and - at the society level -  
results from or leads to social norms that reinforce 
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social cohesion, social inclusion, and the expectation 
of security of person and property. 
Obviously, FCAS are by definition far from the sta-
bility defined here. As it is already the case that the 
interlinkages between labour markets and violent 
conflict are complex and varied and “unlikely to re-
spond to simple policy interventions designed from 
outside to reduce the risk of civil war onset” (Cramer, 
2010, pp. 24–25), the situation in FCAS will hardly be 
any better. In the context of perceived threats of ter-
rorism, international agencies have attempted to 
transfer western securitization approaches to FCAS. 
The core of such approaches is an attempt to increase 
security by reinforcing community cohesion, for  
example, through social programmes. They are often 
accompanied by efforts to foster the formation of 
consensual national identities and common values 
by constraining the expression of ethnic, religious 
and political identities. Securitization involves meas-
ures to prevent people from being drawn into terror-
ism, which entails a security perspective on a grow-
ing range of sectors and institutions that are thought 
to harbour incentives for radicalization. Close moni-
toring and intervening in these sectors and institu-
tions, as well as protection for critical infrastructure, 
such as the transport system, power plants and public 
spaces, by deploying security guards and installing 
security devices are the consequences of securitization 
(Ragazzi, 2017). 
The principles developed by the Conflict Sensitiv-
ity Consortium4 on conflict-sensitivity can be regarded 
as an alternative to securitization. The principles 
comprise the ability of a company, investor, donor, or 
any other organization to understand the context it 
operates in, to think through the interactions be-
tween its intervention and that context, and to act 
upon this understanding in order to minimize nega-
tive impacts and maximize positive impacts on a  
society or community affected by armed conflict 
(Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012). Conflict sensi-
tivity thus signifies recognizing the conflict dynam-
ics, including inter-group tensions, the divisive factors, 
and those factors that have the potential to connect  
 
4 \  The Consortium is composed of international development agencies.
groups across conflict lines in the communities 
where a company operates. It means grasping the na-
ture of the company’s engagement and how this af-
fects the conflict context, and also, realizing how the 
conflict affects the company’s activities. Conflict sen-
sitivity requires that companies act in a way that 
avoids reinforcing the existing conflict dynamics, 
and taking opportunities to support peace (Safer-
world, 2016). In short, this means for any investor or 
company operating in a conflict environment or 
FCAS that it avoids actions likely to exacerbate ten-
sions between local groups or cause violence between 
them. A conflict-sensitive approach implies aware-
ness of the underlying conflicts between different 
groups and their livelihoods and leads to a business 
project design that takes account of and mitigates 
the problem (Lenfant & Traoré, 2015).5
Conflict-sensitivity thus calls for a process that 
makes companies or investors increasingly adopt 
business strategies that have a conflict-reducing  
effect. This immediately suggests that conflict- 
sensitive employment must be made a crucial part of 
any process in which employment practices should 
not cause or exacerbate conflict. The term ‘conflict- 
sensitive employment’ has been coined by the  
research team, building on previous research insights 
that have shown that job creation per se is important 
but not sufficient to have a conflict-reducing effect. 
Jobs have to be meaningful, too, if individuals or com-
munities are to consider those jobs as providing  
future prospects. This can be achieved by, for example, 
jobs that provide workers with new skills so that they 
will find employment more easily after the job has 
ended, or skills that enable them to set up a small 
business in their field of specialization. Future pros-
pects can also be created by jobs that are paid well 
5 \  Conflict sensitivity differs from risk management, which takes the 
project as the starting point and identifies the various risks to the pro-
ject. Conflict-sensitivity starts from an analysis of the context and of 
the driving forces for conflict and identifies from there the potential 
risks the project itself might pose to the context. It considers power 
dynamics, values and incentives, inclusion and exclusion, and social 
cohesion (Mitra, 2016). Conflict sensitivity is distinguished from Peace 
and Conflict Impact Assessments, as it is neither a tool nor referring 
to a programme or project, nor an approach of mutual learning driven 
by local people in conflict zones (Barbolet et al., 2005). Conflict sensiti-
vity has been derived from the ‘do no harm’ approach for development 
agencies (Anderson, 1999; see also Grawert et al., 2017).
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enough to make the option of making money by join-
ing an armed organization less attractive. Moreover, a 
conflict-sensitive approach requires inclusive em-
ployment, which avoids divisive effects and the  
potential for conflict in communities. Beyond this, 
companies and investors should ideally comply with 
the ILO standards for decent work, comprising work 
that is productive and delivers a fair income, security 
in the workplace and social protection for families, 
prospects for personal development and social inte-
gration, freedom for people to express their concerns 
and to organize and participate in the decisions that 
affect their lives, as well as equality of opportunity 
and treatment for women and men (ILO, 2016).
Whereas this plea by the ILO goes beyond the 
conditions found in FCAS, it is nevertheless decisive 
in its call for steps to increase the demand for labour, 
and in particular, for the creation of meaningful jobs.  
Ultimately, conflict-sensitive employment calls for 
employment practices that do not cause or exacerbate 
conflict. Company contributions to conflict-sensitive 
employment can involve particular employment 
practices, among them labour recruitment practices 
that are sensitive to local conflict dynamics and con-
texts, providing opportunities for training, including 
on-the-job training, decent wage levels and humane 
labour conditions. As violent conflict imposes a range 
of costs on companies, a conflict-sensitive business 
approach that extends to recruitment and terms of 
employment in an effort to avoid these costs may be 
a strategic choice for company managers (Grawert et 
al., 2017, p. 41).
Ideally, not only employers but also governments 
and local leaders have a role in creating the conditions 
for conflict-sensitive employment. However, the poor 
performance and corruption of state institutions and 
the lack of rule of law that are typical features of FCAS 
are likely to have adverse effects on any meaningful 
support for conflict-sensitive employment strategies. 
This is why the local level, where companies operate, 
has come into focus. Company owners or managers 
need to build relationships with stakeholders who 
have influence and power in order to find ways of 
avoiding escalating conflicts and understanding the 
risks and potential impacts of various employment 
strategies (Grawert et al., 2017). As organizations in 
FCAS are likely to be embedded in patronage networks, 
they will bargain to advance the particular interests 
of certain clientele. Enforcement of regulations and 
standards agreed upon between company managers 
and local powerholders therefore will depend on the 
modes prevailing in the patronage system. There may 
be various groups of employees, employers and either 
governmental or other controlling group representa-
tives making their own agreements in parallel net-
works. These can include procedures for labour  
recruitment that are sensitive to local conflict  
dynamics and contexts, or provisions for training  
opportunities, adequate wage levels and labour condi-
tions, but also other agreements that have the effect 
of perpetuating violence and instability (Grawert et 
al., 2017, pp. 43-44).
There is still a research gap with regard to the 
question of how entrepreneurs acting rationally in 
short timeframes, sometimes in the illicit sphere, 
and linking up with local power networks to make 
gains in a ‘political marketplace’, can introduce con-
flict-sensitivity standards, not only for business strat-
egies but also for employment. Military officers or 
commanders of NSAGs who are at the same time 
businessmen may have clientele among the local  
entrepreneurs, employees and workers who depend 
on them. What incentives can make them act as  
conflict-sensitive employers? The self-governance 
systems and local orders emanating from non-state 
social and economic institutions will have to be taken 
as a given structure and as a framework of equal im-
portance as state structures (which are often entan-
gled with the ‘informal’ structures anyway) when it 
comes to negotiating conflict-sensitive employment 
approaches. Micro-level research is required in order 
to identify the incentives for conflict-sensitive em-
ployment in FCAS. What we present below is an at-
tempt to fill this research gap with a case study of 
construction and transport companies in 
Afghanistan.
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Shirzad, and Ahmad Zaki. The team conducted its sur-
vey by interviewing owners or managers of 40  
registered construction and 21 transport companies 
in Kabul (39), Herat (12), Nangarhar (7), Kandahar (2), 
and Mazar-e Sharif (1) as well as with 42 staff mem-
bers and workers in construction and transport. In 
construction companies, a range of occupations was 
covered, among them engineers, field supervisors in 
charge of site security, administrative staff, structur-
ing and wiring workers and asphalt appliers. As the 
study intended to gain insights into the CIT sub-sec-
tor, two suppliers to construction companies were 
also interviewed. In transport companies, drivers and 
assistant drivers, mechanics, site managers, and 
logistics officers were asked about employment and 
labour conditions. 
In order to assess the economic and policy con-
text, the team conducted expert interviews about the 
development of the business environment and labour 
conditions between 2002 and 2017 with senior officers 
in the Ministry of Finance (revenue and customs  
departments) and the Ministry of Commerce and In-
dustry (investment support department) in Kabul, 
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 
as well as the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs,  
Martyrs and the Disabled in Herat. They also inter-
viewed the Deputy Governor of Herat, a coordinator of 
the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), represent-
atives of the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and In-
dustries (ACCI) in Kabul, representatives of the asso-
ciations of construction companies and of transport 
companies in Kabul and Herat, the director of the  
Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies and the head of 
the National Center for Policy Research in Kabul. In-
formation was also gained from officials at the World 
Bank and the International Finance Corporation in 
Kabul and representatives of various think tanks and 
NGOs active in Kabul.
The team carried out the overview of companies 
and expert interviews from April 2015 until November 
2016. Starting from October 2016, members of TLO met 
six selected ‘pilot companies’ regularly for intensive 
discussions about their experiences of operating in a 
Methodology
FCAS Micro-level research at the company level 
can shed light on the specific contexts under which 
these companies operate, on what their recruitment 
strategies are, and on how they deal with divided so-
cieties in terms of job creation. Afghanistan appears 
to be a suitable case for study, because it is a site that 
has witnessed protracted conflict, undergone periods 
of decreasing and increasing violence, and thus fulfils 
all the characteristics of an FCAS. In order to place 
the focus clearly on the role of the private sector, we 
have selected as our sample companies operating in 
the construction and transport business and hence, 
contributing to infrastructure development. These 
companies can be assumed to have experience both 
within settings of severe armed conflict and in parts 
of the country with a low incidence of violence. More-
over, they are typically connected to, or part of, the 
type of informal economies that prevail in FCAS.
The research has been designed as a combination 
of a survey of companies’ ‘security strategies’ and a 
focus on labour recruitment through in-depth case 
studies of six companies. The latter sample is a mix-
ture of large, medium, and small companies operat-
ing in different parts of Afghanistan.6  The empirical 
research aims to analyze the particular challenges 
facing key agencies in the CIT sub-sector and to iden-
tify potential motives for conflict-sensitive employ-
ment and the opportunities for large-scale roll-out. 
The field research is also aimed at enhancing knowl-
edge about the ways companies are coping with inse-
curity in FCAS, their understanding of the conflict 
context, and how this is reflected in employment 
strategies.
The research team works within a project part-
nership between three organisations: BICC (Bonn 
International Center for Conversion), The Liaison Office 
(TLO) and International Alert. The relevant contacts 
were made and interviews done and translated by 
Edrees Abdianwall, Taqi Amini, Rahmatullah Amiri, 
Elke Grawert, Mohammed Murtaza Haqeeqat, Karima 
Karimi, Zeeba Karimi, Noordad Sahak, Fazalrabi 
6 \  Companies involved in cross-border trade are ignored here; they are 
subject of a separate paper (Grawert et al., 2017a).
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conflict context and of implementing conflict-sensi-
tive employment strategies. 7 Beyond the transdisci-
plinary approach of knowledge-sharing with pilot 
companies, there has been scholarly exchange with a 
senior economic advisor (Dr Dirk Hansohm) and aca-
demic analyses of business in FCAS (Grawert et al., 
2017) to guide this process from an economics per-
spective. This work has been complemented by ap-
proaches from political science, sociology and peace 
and conflict research as the team carry out their con-
flict assessments and context analyses. Background 
information was gleaned from media analyses,  
reports of analysts, official documents of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), 
the security reports from the Secretary General to the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), statistics 
and information from academic and scholarly articles, 
reports of agencies, and books published by various 
organizations and written by various scholars both 
nationally and internationally.
The interviews were analyzed by thematic coding, 
using the qualitative data analysis programme WEFD 
QDA. With this method, unique perceptions of inter-
view partners could be identified in ways that avoid 
the risk of confirming preconceived results. In parallel 
to the interviews, continuous discussions within the 
team, feedback from experts, and literature reviews 
led to adjustments of interview guidelines and exten-
sions of the sample. The variation of perspectives 
from company owners, employees, business associa-
tions, government officials, and international agen-
cies enabled the project team to make an informed 
assessment of the context in which construction and 
transport companies operate. The field research pro-
vided insights into practices of conflict-sensitive em-
ployment that already exist in Afghanistan as well as 
into practices that exacerbate violence. These findings 
enabled us to derive strategies of conflict-sensitive 
employment that are applicable in the context of 
FCAS and initial perspectives for establishing a con-
flict-sensitive employment framework.
7 \  This process of mutual learning and knowledge-sharing will continue 
until autumn 2017 with the aim of developing and testing a conflict- 
sensitive employment framework.
Limitations of the research
The escalating violence in Afghanistan during 
the research period made it impossible for the team 
to move overland and visit the rural areas and sites at 
which construction companies were operating and 
through which transport companies were carrying 
commodities. Even in Kabul it was risky to organize 
out-of-office meetings with several stakeholders  
because meeting halls in hotels have become targets 
for violent attacks. One of the TLO team members 
was severely injured during a Taliban attack on the 
American University in Kabul and had to be replaced 
by colleagues, who then needed some time to famil-
iarize themselves with the project and continue the 
research in Afghanistan. A further constraint stems 
from the low interest of the Afghan Ministry of  
Labour, which the team considered a major stakeholder 
for conflict-sensitive employment. The Ministry so 
far has not received the project team despite appoint-
ments being made. Further constraints occurred due 
to a gap between the academic ambition of the re-
search and the more practical NGO working style of 
the majority of the research team. Nevertheless, com-
mitment and interest of the team members has been 
strong enough to achieve new findings and insights 
which will undoubtedly benefit a wider community 
of practitioners and academics working on FCAS.
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are forced to interact with these powerholders, and 
these conditions strongly affect the ways in which 
companies operate and carry out their projects.  
Superseding the clashes between changing Mujahedin 
groups, Taliban groups resumed fighting against the 
government in 2006 and have since regained control 
over an increasing number of districts.8  A general 
trend of factionalization of NSAGs characterizes the 
current situation in Afghanistan, with commanders 
acting as politicians and businessmen, and a govern-
ment that is torn between the demands of militia- 
backed powerholders. This section outlines the key 
developments that have led to the particular features 
now characterizing the FCAS in Afghanistan. 
The interim administration (2002–2004) estab-
lished after the intervention was headed by Hamid 
Karzai and backed by the International Security  
Assistance Force (ISAF). In 2003, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) took the lead of the ISAF, 
mandated by the United Nations to: 
enable the Afghan government to provide effective 
security across the country and develop new Afghan 
security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never 
again become a safe haven for terrorists (NATO, 2015). 
In 2004, the Loya Jirga (grand council of elders and 
religious and political leaders) appointed Karzai pres-
ident and agreed on a new constitution. The central 
government of Afghanistan attempted to overcome 
the legacy of previous armed conflicts by introducing 
large-scale demobilization, demilitarization and rein-
tegration (DDR) and launching Disbandment of Illegal 
Armed Groups (DIAG) programmes, which were  
utterly opposed or avoided by NSAG leaders. The main 
armed groups were the Hezb-e Islami, the Jamiat-e 
Islami, the Junbesh-e Milli, and the Hezb-e Wahdat. 
The latter three joined forces, forming the ‘Northern 
Alliance’ in 1996–97 to fight the Taliban. The US inter-
vention in late 2001 helped the Northern Alliance 
forces to capture Kabul and oust the Taliban. As a 
8 \  According to data of the US Forces-Afghanistan and the NATO’s Reso-
lute Support mission, in February 2017, Taliban controlled eleven dis-
tricts and influenced 34 districts, whereas the government controlled 
97 districts and had influence in 146 districts. Hence, 11 percent of the 
districts were under Taliban control and 60 percent under government 
control, and 29 percent of Afghanistan’s 407 districts were contested 
(Roggio, 2017).
Violent conflict has affected the Afghan society in 
waves, rising and falling, since the late 1970s. After 
the US army intervened in Afghanistan and deposed 
the Taliban government in 2001, the violence declined 
for some time while large-scale aid was poured into 
the country in an effort to develop and stabilize the 
economy. Increasing violence flared up again from 
the mid-2000s and has become devastating since 2014, 
when Taliban splinter groups, criminal gangs, and 
the so-called Islamic State stepped up attacks on 
premises of Afghan security forces and compounds 
as well as hotels and guesthouses where the interna-
tional staff of aid and humanitarian agencies are 
based. Fighting between government troops and  
Taliban groups has also intensified. In order to provide 
the context within which construction and transport 
companies have been operating, this chapter offers 
an outline of the political developments and the 
causes of rising insecurity, followed by an account of 
the economic development. It highlights the role of 
the government and aid agencies in the economy and, 
above all, in employment. The chapter ends with 
some remarks on patterns and dynamics of conflict 
within Afghanistan. These patterns vary greatly at 
the local level and will thus have different implica-
tions for the design of conflict-sensitive business and 
employment strategies. 
 
Politics and security developments
The first few years following the ousting of the 
Taliban regime that had ruled in Kabul from 1996 to 
2001 was a time of severe factional conflict between 
non-state armed groups (NSAGs). At local level, fol-
lowers of individual commanders engaged in severe 
infighting. These groups and individuals—all under 
the umbrella of the Mujahedin—had roots in the 
struggle against Soviet occupation (1979–1989), when 
they had organized as political parties in exile in  
Pakistan and established armed wings with weapons 
and funding supplied by the Gulf states, Pakistan and 
the US. Some of those commanders of NSAGs continue 
to play a role in politics even today. They still control 
particular territories, so communities and businesses 
The Afghan context 2001–2017
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impunity to Hekmatyar and his followers despite the 
war crimes committed by the group has alienated 
many Afghans, and Hezb-e Islami groups have refused 
to lay down their arms (UNSC, 2017, p. 11, Radio Free  
Afghanistan, 11 May 2017). 
This brief overview pinpoints the continuities of 
the militant political landscape of Afghanistan, 
which shapes the environment in which construction 
implement building projects and transport companies 
arrange shipments. The Taliban have also split into 
factions that fight against the international coalition 
forces and the government, predominantly in the 
southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. 
In 2014, the ISAF completed the gradual handing 
over the responsibility for security to the national 
forces of Afghanistan and was replaced by the Resolute 
Support Mission. Mediated by the then US Secretary 
of State, John Kerry, a National Unity Government was 
formed through a coalition between the two compet-
ing candidates who had won most of the votes:  
Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, sworn in as the new presi-
dent, and Abdullah Abdullah, as his ‘chief executive 
officer’ (The Economist, 22.09.2014). Ghani’s political  
endeavours were shaped by his background as eco-
nomic advisor to the World Bank during the 1990s, 
when he designed economic reforms and structural 
adjustment programmes for developing countries. As 
Minister of Finance in the interim government and 
special advisor to Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, the 
UN Secretary General’s special envoy to Afghanistan, 
Ghani was already engaged in developing a roadmap 
for political transition between 2001 and 2004 and 
preparing the Loya Jirga. From 2010 to 2013, Ghani was 
the chairman of the Transition Coordination Com-
mission in charge of the transfer of power from the 
ISAF and NATO troops to the Afghan Security Forces. 
Economic reforms through a market-liberal approach, 
combatting corruption and “fixing failed states” 
(Ghani & Lockhart, 2009) were high on his agenda. 
This World Bank-informed approach led him to be 
portrayed as a ‘technocrat’ (Rasmussen, 2014). His 
‘CEO’, Abdullah Abdullah, with whom president Ghani 
has to consult when making political appointments 
and major decisions, once played a prominent role in 
result, Jamiat-e Islami, which had led the Northern 
Alliance, seized the most important positions of power 
in the post-2001 government. Its relationship with 
the other parties disintegrated, leading in in several 
instances to violent power struggles over access to 
power, mostly involving regional and local rule. 
Co-optation of NSAG commanders into the govern-
ment neither ended the power struggles nor led to 
disarmament of NSAGs. Given the Taliban resurgence 
after 2006, some of the commanders believe that the 
Mujahedin who had fought against the Soviet occupa-
tion are predestined to combat the Taliban instead of 
foreign forces. One of them is Ismael Khan, governor 
of Herat (1992–1995) and Afghanistan’s minister of  
energy and water (2004–2013), who is affiliated to the 
Jamiat-e Islami party and an influential power- holder 
in western Afghanistan (Masoud, 2015).9 Another 
example of the political tenacity of commanders is  
Abdurrashid Dostum, a general from northern  
Afghanistan, who heads the Junbesh-e Milli, a com-
munist NSAG and political party until 1992 and there-
after representing Uzbek and Turkmen interests  
(Ruttig, 2009). Dostum became the First Vice President 
of Afghanistan in 2014.10  The Hezb-e Wahdat party, 
formed in Iran with the aim of uniting the Afghan 
Shi’a groups, also split into factions soon after the 
ouster of the Taliban. The faction led by Mohammad 
Mohaqeq is the strongest group representing the 
Hazara11 (Ruttig, 2009). Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is the 
founder and leader of the Hezb-e Islami, a political 
party with an armed wing. During the civil war,  
Hekmatyar became prime minister of Afghanistan 
shortly before the Taliban seized power, forcing him 
to leave the country. After a peace deal with the current 
government, he returned in May 2017. The granting of 
9 \  The former leader of the Jamiat-e Islami Burhanuddin Rabbani was 
president of Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996 and led the Jamiat forces 
until he died in a Taliban suicide attack in 2011. His son Salahuddin 
Rabbani took over leadership of the party, became Chairman of the 
Afghan High Peace Council in 2012 and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
2015 (Bazarak, 2005; Ruttig, 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no year).
10 \  Like other warlords, Dostum and his militia committed atrocities 
during the civil war. In May 2017, torture accusations were raised 
against Dostum’s followers.
11 \  An estimated nine per cent of the Afghan population belongs to the 
ethnic group of the Hazara; however, there have been no verified figures 
since 1978, when the last reliable census took place (Afghan Network, 
no date).
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have had a tremendous impact on the performance 
of the economy.
Shifts in the economic environment
A brief look into the history of the private sector 
in Afghanistan clarifies the trajectory of the Afghan 
economy after the international intervention of 2001. 
The first attempt to promote a private sector was 
made by the minister of national economy Majid  
Zabuli (1936–1955), who founded the Central Bank of 
Afghanistan and three other banks. They were all na-
tionalized under Communist rule (1978–1989). The 
civil war (1992–1996) prevented the establishment of 
private companies, and the subsequent Taliban re-
gime (1996–2001) did not encourage the private sector. 
Throughout these decades, the rule of law did not  
exist in Afghanistan, while the attitude of the govern- 
ment towards private companies remained arbitrary. 
Taxation was neither regulated nor transparent nor 
enforced. Little was done to develop human capital. 
For instance, the Afghan education system did not 
teach practical and business skills. Nevertheless, 
there were Afghan entrepreneurs doing business in 
places like Dubai, China or Japan, so that the wide-
spread refusal of Afghan company owners to pay for a 
franchise or a market analyst cannot be explained by 
ignorance but, rather, by their experience of severe 
uncertainty in Afghanistan. Lack of infrastructure, 
electricity, spare parts, supplies and other inputs, 
which the government had not provided in many 
parts of the country, made setting up a business addi-
tionally risky (Fishstein & Amiryar, 2015; Ghiasy et al., 
2015). Hence, the market as it emerged after the inter-
national intervention was largely artificial due to the 
boom in demand by international troops and agen-
cies, and since 2012, with the gradual withdrawal of 
the international forces, this market has been 
declining.
Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising that 
the private sector of Afghanistan has not gained a 
strong voice to present its interests to the government. 
the ‘Northern Alliance’ and is a member of Jamiat-e 
Islami, hence attracting votes from some former allies. 
Agreements between these two leaders have proved 
difficult to reach, and power struggles are almost 
inevitable.
Mounting insecurity has been a major challenge 
for the ‘National Unity Government’. In 2015, security 
incidents not only increased but spread throughout 
the country. For the first time since 2001, a provincial 
capital—Kunduz—fell into the hands of the Taliban. 
Temporarily they captured 24 district centres in the 
north (in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab, Jawzjan, 
Kunduz, Sari Pul and Takhar provinces), in the west 
(in Badghis and Farah provinces), in the east (in 
Nuristan Province) and in the south (in Helmand and 
Kandahar provinces) (UNSC, 2016, p. 4). The Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-
KP) claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks 
in Nangarhar, eastern Afghanistan and Kabul. 12 At-
tempts by the National Unity Government to include 
Taliban leaders in peace talks in 2015 and 2016 failed. 
In 2016, the UNSC recorded 3,498 civilian fatalities 
and 7,920 wounded, while 6,785 Afghan soldiers died 
in battles and 11,777 were injured between January 
and November (UNSC, 2017).
The FCASs in Afghanistan are characterized by 
power struggles between various leaders of armed 
groups. From the perspective of some donor agencies, 
however, ‘weak governance’ has been seen as the fac-
tor allowing the violent conflicts to continue (Hopkins, 
2014, p. 39; World Bank, 2016). Reversing cause and  
effect, this perspective inevitably leads to assess-
ments of the government as incompetent, corrupt, 
predatory and too reliant on donors (Cusack & Malm-
strom, 2010, p. 6). Others regard the continuous vio-
lent conflict as the factor destabilizing the government 
(GTZ, 2009). These views ignore the fact that members 
of the government are part and parcel of political 
power struggles that are fought out through violent 
means. The continuous deterioration of security, the  
gradual withdrawal of international troops along 
with a reduction of international aid, and the limited 
capacity of the government to implement policies 
12 \  For a background study on the ISIL-KP (‘Daesh in Afghanistan’) see 
Mielke & Miszak, forthcoming  in 2017.
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subsistence and low productivity jobs, with most of 
the rest being employed in precarious casual or tem-
porary jobs (ILO, 2012, p. 6). The employment trends 
are provided in Table 1.
 The data of the Central Statistical Office of  
Afghanistan show a decline in labour force participa-
tion until 2013/14 and a slight increase in 2016. Obvi-
ously the figure of eight percent unemployment dur-
ing the economic boom phase concealed widespread 
underemployment (ILO, 2012). The Central Statistics 
Office of Afghanistan made certain adjustments in 
the data collection so that statistics for 2011/12 and 
thereafter reflect the high rate of ‘not gainfully em-
ployed population’ and the continuously high propor-
tion of ‘own-account and contributing family workers’ 
The Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries 
(ACCI), founded in 2004, is a centralized institution 
with branches only in the largest cities. Small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) in the provinces do not 
have any institution to represent their interests. 
Hence, organized lobbyism in the interest of private 
companies has remained weak in Afghanistan. The 
legislative and private business associations are not 
connected as institutions. Rather than involving the 
parliament as such, business associations prefer to 
address the executive directly or approach certain 
Members of Parliament (MPs)  individually and pay 
them for ‘favours’ (Ghiasy et al., 2015; Fishstein & 
Amiryar, 2015).
Nevertheless, Afghanistan experienced rapid eco-
nomic growth at a rate of around nine percent be-
tween 2003 and 2012, with some fluctuations (World 
Bank, 2015), relatively low inflation (after hyperinfla-
tion in the 1990s), improved public financial manage-
ment, and rising access to basic health and education. 
Key social indicators, including life expectancy and 
maternal mortality, improved markedly (however 
from an extremely low base). 13 World Bank statistics 
reveal that despite the substantial growth, accompa-
nied by increases in school enrolment and access to 
water, the nationwide poverty rate remained stagnant 
at about 36 percent between 2007 and 2015. Afghanistan 
has remained one of the world’s least developed 
countries, with a per capita gross national product 
(GNP) of US $520 in 2010, US $720 in 2013, and US $630 
in 2015 (current prices) (World Bank, 2016; World 
Bank, 2016b).
The economic upsurge also brought an increase 
of women’s participation in the economy. In 2011, the 
employment-population ratio for men was 74.9 per 
cent, for women 15.5 per cent, and overall 45.7 per cent 
(ILO, 2015). In 2016, 80.5 per cent of men and 26.7 per 
cent of women at working age participated in the  
labour force. However, only 65.7 per cent of the total 
labour force was gainfully employed or self-employed 
(CSO, 2017). This is reflected in around 60 per cent of 
the labour force working in agriculture, mostly in 
13 \  Life expectancy rose from 50 (1990) to 55 (2000) and to 60 years (2015) 
(World Bank, 2017). Maternal mortality per 100,000 live births declined 
from 1,340 in 1990 to 1,100 in 2000 and to 396 in 2015 (WHO, 2016).
Table 1  
Development of employment in Afghanistan
Employment status / 
fiscal year
2007/08* 2011/12* 2013/14* 2016**
Employment to  
population rate
62.0 45.7 42.9 43.4
Employment rate *** 93.0 No data 
(see FN 7)
No data No data
Proportion of own- 
account and contributing 
family workers in total 
employment
76.9 80.5 78.8 No data
Unemployment rate *** 7.0 8.2 22.6 19.4
Underemployment 
rate****
No data 16.8 16.4 14.9
Percentage of not gain-
fully employed popula-
tion (= unemployed + 
underemployed)
No data 25.0 39.0 34.3
Notes: *Since 2011/12, a different and more differentiated method of statis-
tical survey has been applied, so that the more recent data are not 
comparable with previous data; **April to September; *** in per cent of 
total labour force; **** in per cent of population 
Sources: EU & GIRoA, 2008; CSO, 2014; CSO, 2017.
CONFLICT-SENSITIV EMPLOYMENT IN AFGHAN CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT COMPANIES \ E. GRAWERT & F. SHIRZAD 
19 \ \ WORKING PAPER 5  \ 2017
businessmen to relocate abroad during the 1980s and 
1990s, leaving space for the emergence of a new gener-
ation of businessmen with close ties to factions and 
commanders of armed groups. After 2001, this genera-
tion expanded its activities and took the place of the 
established business families. Commanders of NSAGs 
and factional leaders had financial reserves available 
for investment and were looking for ways to safeguard 
their long-term financial autonomy once direct foreign 
aid to the militias stopped. One means of securing 
their capital was to be co-opted into the Afghan gov-
ernment (Giustozzi, 2006), indicating the perpetuation 
of a direct nexus between political and economic power. 
Due to the absence of a durable political settlement in 
Afghanistan for nearly forty years, short-run intra-elite 
bargaining among shifting groups, mostly armed, has 
characterized Afghan politics. Hence, direct violence 
and the threat of violence by a range of powerful 
groups have remained an integral part of the political 
process. Administrative positions in government as well 
as privileged access to economic resources—public 
procurement contracts, revenue sources, land, mining 
contracts, and proceeds from illicit economic activities 
—are some of the spoils over which this elite bargaining 
takes place (World Bank, 2016; DFID, 2008). 
The Afghan Ministry of Commerce and Industries 
estimates that 70 to 80 per cent of SMEs are not for-
mally registered because of their fear of bureaucracy 
and corruption. This leaves them particularly vulnera-
ble to exploitation by ‘mafias’ consisting mainly of 
company managers, government officers and local pol-
iticians organizing illegal business (Mashal, 2014, p. 10). 
Pain & Mallet (2014, pp. 17–18) confirm that the non-for-
malization of business in Afghanistan is not a result of 
a difficulty in registering a business (at least for men). 
Rather, businesses are likely to avoid formalization in 
order to avoid paying higher taxes, bribes and 
bureaucracy. 
The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business indicator 
(a composite indicator of nine sub-indicators) is a 
common and comparable measure of the quality of 
the environment in which businesses operate. The 
country with the easiest, most favourable business  
environment is ranked lowest, and the country with 
the most difficult environment highest. The business 
on the Afghan labour market. The data indicate that 
international efforts to support economic development 
had failed to generate regular, sufficiently paid and 
long-term employment opportunities for workers.
Every Afghan perceives unemployment as devas-
tating. A perception survey by the Asia Foundation in 
2014 showed variations across the country, with  
Afghans in the north-east regarding unemployment 
as far more of an issue than Afghans in the west, and 
those in urban areas rating it as more of a problem 
than respondents in rural areas. The survey high-
lights that unemployment had forced many Afghans 
to migrate in search of work, which not only placed a 
strain on the areas where they resettled but also left a 
vacuum in the areas they had left (Hopkins, 2014, pp. 
51-53). In 2016, nearly 60 percent of the respondents 
stated that the employment opportunities for their 
household members had worsened compared to 2015, 
and more than 70 percent regarded unemployment 
as the biggest problem facing the youth of Afghani-
stan (Warren et al., 2016, pp. 6, 8).
Most Afghan enterprises operate in the informal 
sector, playing an important role in skills development 
as they are providing on-the-job training for an esti-
mated 600,000 young people (GIZ, 2015). The informal 
economy maintains a considerable degree of self-or-
ganization, following regulations that emanate from 
non-state actors and informal institutions (Wilde & 
Mielke, 2013). The Afghan state is engaged with the 
informal economy and entangled in it. Many state offi-
cials pursue informal economic activities themselves 
and have vested interests in maintaining the informal 
economy. This explains why negotiated arrangements 
over taxation or regulatory policies frequently occur. 
Studies confirm that, in FCASs, it is not the government 
or state authorities but rather the social legitimacy  
attributed to economic activities and the relative power 
of particular groups that determine what is considered 
legal and illegal (Grawert et al., 2017, p. 7).
Some scholars explain the low performance of the 
government in addressing the country’s economic 
problems by pointing to strong interconnections be-
tween politics and business stemming from the war. 
Giustozzi (2006) points out that the civil war and the 
rise of the Taliban had caused many Afghan 
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and dysfunctional societal relations. Second is the  
demographic and geographic landscape, with birth 
rates above five per woman and a young population  
below 15 years exceeding 40 percent of the population 
(Index Mundi, 2014), whilst large numbers of refugees 
and internally displaced persons return to Afghanistan. 
The third constraint is declining aid, requiring “addi-
tional efforts to develop new sources of growth, expand 
effective service delivery, mobilize revenues and prior-
itize spending” (World Bank, 2016). Taking a critical 
perspective on the market-liberal approach that the 
World Bank and other western agencies have promoted 
in Afghanistan since 2002, a further constraint is the 
concentration of assets, land and business in the 
hands of cronies with special connections to, or even 
co-opted into, the government. Economic decisions ap-
parently depend more on the ability to forge relation-
ships with powerholders and to seize opportunities in 
a distorted economy than on market forces (Fishstein 
& Amiryar, 2015). 
The role of aid in the employment crisis
High aid inflows have benefited Afghanistan, but 
also brought problems. Whereas an estimated US $62 
billion was pledged for the period between 2002 and 
2013 (Poole, 2011), the Afghan government disbursed 
much less due to low absorption capacity. 14 Aid 
steered the economic liberalization and reform pro-
cess in Afghanistan and underpinned much of the 
progress, including the growth in key services and in-
frastructure. It modernized the government adminis-
tration but also contributed to corruption and frag-
mented and parallel delivery systems (Hogg et al., 
2013). After 9/11, the USA resumed the support of 
14 \  In 2015, out of US $4.26 billion of bilateral aid, US $3.73 billion was dis-
bursed. The largest donor was USAID with US $1.254 billion of aid (US  
$1.107 billion disbursed). In addition, Afghanistan received US $1.112 
billion of multilateral aid, of which the European Union was the lar-
gest donor committing US $542.7 million (only US $339.3 million dis-
bursed), second the Asian Development Bank (US $297 million com-
mitted and US $154.1 million disbursed) and third the World Bank (US 
$271.5 million committed and US $253 million disbursed (CSO, 2016). 
Between 2002 and 2016, the World Bank supported the government of 
Afghanistan with funding totalling US $2,339,790,000, with a peak of 
US $311,800,000 in 2007, a low of US $21,500,000 in 2015, and a signifi-
cant increase again to US $250,000,000 in 2016 (compiled from World 
Bank, 2017).
environment of Afghanistan is among the most difficult 
globally, ranking 177 out of 189 in 2016. According to 
this indicator, it has become comparably more difficult 
to do business in Afghanistan during the post-2011  
reform phase. Among the areas of most concern, only 
trading across borders has improved slightly (World 
Bank, 2016a).
The poor business environment in Afghanistan  
results from deep economic, political and social distor-
tions and conflicts and therefore cannot easily be rec-
tified by technical or liberalization measures. It reflects 
persistent economic inequalities and uncertainties. 
Over the fifteen years following the ousting of the Tali-
ban regime, private sector confidence has slumped, the 
value added by industry as a percentage of GDP de-
clined, and a fiscal crisis unfolded as shrinking reve-
nues have led to depleted cash reserves and an accu-
mulation of arrears. As the lowest exporter and second 
highest importer in the region, Afghanistan’s economy 
has remained weak and highly imbalanced. Security 
concerns, access issues, corruption and unclear busi-
ness policies are regarded as the reasons for this low 
performance (World Bank, 2016; ILO, 2012, pp. 21‒25).
After a difficult period following the election of 
2014, World Bank experts held that the government 
managed to establish the conditions for a slow recov-
ery of the economy (Joya et al., 2016). Government reve-
nues increased in 2015, partly through more effective 
tax collection, improved control of corruption, espe-
cially at the customs, and new tax levies. However, 
some analysts caution that revenues from import tax 
have already reached their limit and over-taxation of 
the small group of large taxpayers domiciled in  
Afghanistan must be avoided (Byrd & Payenda, 2016,  
pp. 2‒4).
It seems to be too early to speak of a recovery from 
the marked decline of economic growth. According to 
the Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook, in the fiscal year 
of 2015-16, the real GDP growth reached 0.9 per cent 
when opium production is excluded and -2.4 percent 
when it is included (CSO, 2016, p. VIII). The World Bank 
(2016) regards pervasive poverty as the key underlying 
cause of the crisis in Afghanistan and identifies three 
major constraints to a flourishing economy. First is 
conflict and fragility, defined as weak state institutions 
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Afghans (AFN) 5 to 6,000 per month for the sale of 
handwoven cloth and received AFN 5,000 per month 
in addition from the World Bank (Ministry of Labour, 
Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled, Herat,  
November 2015). The vocational training centres are 
an example of the strong dependency on aid. 
World Bank experts estimated as early as 2013 
that a US $500 million cut in the aid delivered outside 
Afghanistan’s budget would directly affect 11,000 to 
18,000 short-term jobs. The authors anticipated that 
the decline would increase underemployment and 
reduce household incomes by reducing casual labour 
opportunities and lowering payment for skilled em-
ployees, rather than lead to much higher open unem-
ployment. They expected the impact of aid reduction 
to be greatest in urban centres and conflict-affected 
provinces, which had received more aid per capita.  
Labour markets would be able to adjust if aid was  
reduced in a gradual and controlled way, because 
growth in the security, mining and civilian public 
sectors could partly offset aid-related job losses. The 
experts held that aid reductions were unlikely to  
enhance poverty markedly, whereas low economic 
growth would have exactly this effect due to mount-
ing unemployment (Hogg et al. 2013). In fact, the par-
tial withdrawal of international security forces since 
2014, combined with continuing political uncertain-
ties and mounting violence, has caused a significant 
deceleration of economic growth and a surge in un-
employment (Joya et al., 2016). 
The upsurge of World Bank assistance in 2016 
(see footnote 10) indicates that the Bank considers 
these impacts serious enough for it to continue its 
economic adjustment measures through its influence 
on the Afghan government. It promotes the develop-
ment of mining and agriculture in order to improve 
food security and provide Afghanistan with a major 
export industry (World Bank, 2014, p. 8). Moreover, the 
World Bank and other agencies have put a stronger 
focus on supporting private sector development (PSD), 
not only for economic reasons but also as a means of 
reducing conflict and building peace in the country 
(World Bank, 2012, pp. 1‒2). PSD is considered all the 
more important now that foreign troops are 
selected commanders of NSAGs and strongmen on a 
large scale, with at least US $70 million being allocated 
to these actors (Giustozzi, 2006). These mixed endeav-
ours call into question the effectiveness of aid sup-
plied to Afghanistan (Hogg et al., 2013). 
The employment impact of aid has not been large. 
International assistance focused on creating employ-
ment in conflict areas rather than throughout society. 
The type of employment being generated was not 
geared towards increased labour productivity (World 
Bank, 2016) as it generally entailed short-term un-
skilled jobs and cash-for-work programmes. These 
jobs provided a quick and visible peace dividend but 
no sustainability in terms of employment or develop-
ment (GTZ, 2009; GIZ, 2015). One estimate calculated 
that by 2012 6 to 10 per cent of the working population 
had benefited from aid-financed job opportunities, 
most of them for less than six months (Hogg et al., 
2013).
Medium-term effects were expected from the  
establishment of vocational training centres and 
academies for teachers who were trained to teach in 
those centres. However, in the face of 1.7 million un-
skilled young Afghans, the plan to establish 250 voca-
tional training centres for 90,000 apprentices with 
2,700 teachers to be trained in two teachers training 
academies between 2012 and 2017 (BMZ & GIZ, 2014, 
2015) reveals the magnitude of the task ahead. Even 
worse, by 2015, only 46,000 Afghans had completed 
the training (GIZ, 2015). In Herat, where several inter-
national NGOs delivered vocational training in eight 
centres for about 15,000 persons per year, the number 
had declined to less than 5,000 by 2015, and only three 
centres were operating. Training had comprised 
courses for mechanics, electricians, plumbers, tailors, 
computer and mobile phone repair, motorcycles re-
pair, carpet making, and carpentry, all aimed at young 
people; and curtain sewing and beauty parlour shop 
management aimed at women in particular. These 
qualified for occupations typical of informal enter-
prises in urban settings, but not geared to agriculture, 
where most of the Afghan population is occupied. A 
particular target group receiving training in Herat 
was the widows of martyrs, who were earning  
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particular role of the CIT business in Afghanistan, we 
will outline the economic activities falling under CIT 
and the contribution of the CIT sector to the economy 
of Afghanistan and clarify its role in job creation. The 
surveys, reports and statistics collected by the govern- 
ment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), 
along with data from the Integrated Business Enter-
prise Survey (IBES) and the Business Establishment 
Survey (BES), provide the relevant information for 
tracking the development of business and employment.
How construction and transport companies have 
tried to adjust to the difficult and highly diverse po-
litical, economic, and conflict conditions prevailing 
in Afghanistan is explained in the following section 
on the basis of field research findings. Construction 
and transport companies have different structures 
and are exposed to the political and security environ-
ment in different ways, so they will be considered 
separately. The chapter ends with an account of the 
perceptions of insecurity by owners and managers of 
construction and transport companies and explores 
the ways in which they attempt to overcome the 
problems.
withdrawing and international aid is declining 
whilst the country moves away from a situation in 
which as much as 40 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP 
used to be derived from development assistance. The 
number of registrations of new firms has shown a 
marginal increase compared to 2014, but remains 
considerably lower than the levels recorded in 2011 
and 2012. World Bank experts suggest that this re-
flects the decline in confidence due to the worsening 
security environment (Joya et al., 2016). Very few large-
scale investment projects were launched in 2015. The 
most significant of these involved the construction of 
a steel mill in Kabul with total domestic investment 
valued at US $25 million (Joya et al., 2016). 
As the bulk of the private sector consists of SMEs, 
the approach of PSD towards peacebuilding has at-
tracted numerous international organizations to-
wards engagement with this labour-intensive sector 
of the economy (ABADE, 2016; ASMED, 2007; ACBAR, 
2016; Mashal, 2014). SMEs have played a key role in 
propelling some of today’s most advanced economies 
(Hettiarachchi et al., 2009, p. 5). They are estimated to 
absorb around 75 per cent of Afghanistan’s labour 
force and generate over 50 percent of the country’s 
GDP (ASMED, 2007). The increased attention on SMEs 
stems from their high share of the Afghan market 
and from the assumption that they tend to have clos-
er relationships with the communities in which they 
operate than large companies (Khan & Ahmed, 2014,  
p. 6; Grawert et al., 2017, pp. 28‒29). 
The above analysis shows that private business 
in Afghanistan has to operate under conditions 
shaped by the legacy of armed conflicts, with large 
local variations in patterns and dynamics of conflict. 
Companies have to manage their projects accordingly, 
always considering the locally prevailing lines of 
conflict and relations of power. Whether enterprises 
can play a role in reducing conflict and, if so, how, re-
mains an open question. Only thorough field re-
search can deliver authoritative answers, and these 
answers will necessarily be contingent on local con-
ditions and obviously cannot be generalized.
Construction and transport companies have 
flourished due to donor investment and logistical  
requirements since 2002. In order to understand the 
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km asphalted) in 2015–16. The Afghanistan Statistical 
Yearbook 2015-16 states: “Construction output de-
creased by 55.3% in 2015–16 compared to 2014–15. Road 
construction in 2015–16 has decreased by 42.6% com-
pared to 2014–15” (CSO, 2016, p. 178).  
Production and import of cement, if not a perfect 
indicator, can roughly reflect the volume of construc-
tion activities in the country. The production and im-
port of cement decreased dramatically from around 
6.7 million tons in 2013–2014 to approximately 3.48 
million tons in 2014–15 and 2.6 million tons in 2015–16. 
The number of heavy vehicles and machines owned 
by construction companies declined from 4,313 in 
2013–14 to 3,521 in 2014–15 and even further to 3,336 in 
2015–16. Only 560 buildings were constructed or under 
construction in 2015–16, compared to more than dou-
ble that figure in each of the two previous years (1,252 
and 1,188 respectively) (CSO, 2016). Obviously, con-
struction of buildings was thriving when foreign 
agencies and troops, as well as newly set-up local 
businesses, were requiring new offices and premises. 
The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) 
registered about 2,000 companies between 2006 and 
2013, among them about 600 construction companies 
investing more than US $6 million. These figures 
have to be treated with caution, though, because 
among them investments were recorded that never 
materialized in reality, and others are falsified to  
reduce tax liability (Leslie, 2015, pp. 17, 39). When the 
demand by foreign agencies and troops then declined, 
construction activities slumped and many construc-
tion companies closed down, as testified by the nu-
merous uncompleted buildings in Kabul and Herat.
Infrastructure
Infrastructure covers a broad range of activities 
across several sectors of the economy. Therefore, nei-
ther the ISIC nor the Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 
classifies infrastructure as a separate category. Infra-
structure includes construction of roads, railways,  
irrigation canals, hospitals, schools, electricity sub-
stations, and telecommunication towers, among others. 
Infrastructure projects require construction work 
and logistics and hence, transportation.
The CIT sector, its development and 
context
This section provides definitions and statistics on 
the CIT sub-sector in Afghanistan, distinguishing be-
tween construction, infrastructure, transport, and 
employment.
Construction
The Central Statistics Organization of Afghani-
stan uses the International Standard Industrial Clas-
sification (ISIC) Version 4 for classification of indus-
trial production when compiling relevant reports and 
statistics. According to the ISIC of All Economic  
Activities, construction: 
includes general construction and specialized con-
struction activities for buildings and civil engineer-
ing works. It includes new work, repair, additions 
and alterations, the erection of prefabricated build-
ings or structures on the site and also construction 
of a temporary nature. General construction is the 
construction of entire dwellings, office buildings, 
stores and other public and utility buildings, farm 
buildings etc., or the construction of civil engineer-
ing works such as motorways, streets, bridges, tun-
nels, railways, airfields, harbours and other water 
projects, irrigation systems, sewerage systems, in-
dustrial facilities, pipelines and electric lines, sports 
facilities etc. (UN Statistics Division, 2008, p. 172).
The construction sector in Afghanistan wit-
nessed a constant expansion, rising in value from 
8,700 million Afghans (AFN) in 2002‒03 to AFN 124,280 
million in 2015‒16, when it accounted for over 10 per 
cent of the economy of Afghanistan. Its contribution 
as percentage of GDP was 7.84, 8.89 and 10.03 respec-
tively in 2013–14, 2014–15 and 2015–16 (CSO, 2016). 
Despite the 8.1 per cent growth of the construc-
tion sector in 2015–2016 compared to the previous year, 
when we dig deeper into the data it emerges that the 
sector suffered a decline in many of its component 
activities. For example, in 2013–14, total roads con-
structed measured 3,915 km, of which 1,059 km were 
asphalted. The figure rose to 5,619 km (930 km as-
phalted) in 2014–15, and fell back to 3,226 km (1,300 
Construction, infrastructure and transport 
(CIT) business in Afghanistan
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The ADB admits that the situation in Afghani stan in 
2015 and 2016 does not justify the reduction of aid, 
stating: “Military conflicts and regional disputes 
have seen [sic!] instability in national security, politi-
cal uncertainty, disjointed governance, and a fragility 
in the rule of law” (ADB, 2015). 
Thus, post-conflict assistance, which was sup-
posed to terminate, will be resumed for some more 
years, making it all the more crucial for assistance 
providers to understand how construction and trans-
port companies operate in a conflict environment, 
and how employment can be made conflict-sensitive. 
Transport 
Transportation and storage fall under the servic-
es sector. According to the UN Statistics Division, the 
transportation and storage section of the services 
sector includes “the provision of passenger or freight 
transport, whether scheduled or not, by rail, pipeline, 
road, water or air and associated activities such as 
terminal and parking facilities, cargo handling, stor-
age, etc. Included in this section is the renting of 
transport equipment with driver or operator” (UN 
Statistics Division, 2008, p. 194). 
The Afghan Ministry of Transport and Civil Avia-
tion (MoTCA) is in charge of regulating private-sector 
transport, coordinating agreements between private 
Afghan and international transporters, and establish-
ing offices in neighbouring countries to facilitate in-
ternational trade. The ministry’s private-sector de- 
partment sets the technical standards for private 
commercial vehicles and inspects them for compli-
ance during licensing and the process of license  
renewal. The MoTCA collects fees from the operators 
of private trucks and inter-provincial private buses at 
national or provincial borders or on the outskirts of 
major cities and provides some passenger and freight 
transport services itself by using state-owned 
vehicles. 
The percentage contribution of transport and 
storage to GDP is the highest not only in the services 
sector but in all categories of the Afghan GDP and, in 
total, exceeds the entire industry sector. The develop-
ment of the value of transport and storage between 
The Word Bank and the ILO regard infrastructure 
development as an indispensable precursor to im-
provements in the mining and agricultural sector. 
The rationale for focusing on infrastructure is that  
it will contribute to providing water and electricity 
to urban as well as rural areas (World Bank, 2014,  
pp. 89–90; GIZ, 2014), connecting neighbouring coun-
tries with improved roads, and thus boost distribution 
(World Bank, 2014, p. 12). This is all the more important 
as many Afghans have been moving to—or back to—
urban areas, especially to the country’s capital.  
Kabul’s population reached a size officially estimated 
at 3,917,241 in 2015–16 (CSO, 2016a)15  and has hence 
nearly doubled since 2001. This gives Afghanistan one 
of the highest urbanization rates in the region, en-
tailing pressures to improve the infrastructure to  
accommodate the growing urban population and to  
relieve the stress on services, which could lead to 
conflict (ILO, 2014; GIZ, 2014, p. 1). The services sector, 
including transport, is expected to adapt and develop 
as a result of investment in infrastructure (World 
Bank, 2014; ILO, 2012, p. 19).
Recent official agreements indicate that infra-
structure development will remain central in  
Afghanistan over the coming years (ADB, 2016). The 
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) 
programme, led by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
as the main donor to Afghanistan, has already invested 
US $2.2 billion in upgrading and constructing roads 
across Afghanistan (ADB, 2017). Within the frame-
work of the Afghanistan National Peace and Develop-
ment Framework (ANPDF) for 2016–2021, prepared by 
the government of Afghanistan, the ADB plans to 
continue its focus on infrastructure development in 
the areas of transport and energy, and on agriculture 
and mining. The proposed grant programme for 2017–
2019 comprises US $1.29 billion, whereas the govern-
ment of Afghanistan is to allocate US $659.270 million 
(ADB, 2016). This shows that infrastructure building 
is mainly driven by large-scale investment by inter-
national banks and foreign donors contracting com-
panies to implement the required construction projects. 
 
15 \  Unofficial estimates maintain much higher numbers.
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Survey (IBES) was conducted in 2009 with technical 
and financial support from the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), while the Business Establishment Survey 
(BES) was carried out in 2015 with the support of the 
World Bank and the Department for International 
Development (DFID) (CSO, 2016b). The IBES covered 
non-agricultural economic activities including min-
ing and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas 
and water supply, construction, trade and repair, 
transport and storage, accommodation and food ser-
vice, information and communication, real estate,  
education, health and social work, and other services. 
The BES excluded the mining, transportation and 
small construction establishments, so only covering 
building firms that employ more than ten people 
(CSO, 2016b). 16 
According to the IBES survey, an estimated 
402,000 establishments were operating across the 
country, employing nearly 1.2 million people in 2009 
(CSO, 2009). 17 There were 5,000 (1.2 per cent of all) es-
tablishments operating in the construction sector 
and 1,200 (0.3 per cent) in the transportation sector. 
Trade and repair was the most dominant activity 
among the 12 non-agricultural activities categorized, 
with nearly 117,000 establishments (29%).  Others 
include manufacturing (22%) accommodation and 
food (10%), and ‘other’ services (27%) (CSO, 2009, p. 3). 
The 2015 BES depicts a 71 per cent increase in the 
number of establishments.
The BES data shows 1.4 million individuals working 
in 687,000 private sector establishments across  
Afghanistan. More than half of them (58%) were 
self-employed in their own business, with another 21 
percent consisting of contributing family workers. 
Thus, of the businesses included in the BES, more 
than three out of four employees were working in a 
shop or other business either owned by themselves or 
by a member of their immediate family” (CSO, 2016b, 
p. 14).
Manufacturing was at the top with regard to em-
ployment. Out of the 1,179,063 persons employed, 
 
16 \  The BES took a sample of 7,076 establishments and followed a similar 
methodology and objectives as the IBES, with a few differences in scope 
and methodology.
17 \  Based on a sample of 3,794 company establishments (CSO, 2009).
2002 and 2016 reflects the overall performance of the 
Afghan economy, growing from AFN 19,519 million in 
2002–2003 to AFN 241,354 million in 2013–14 and then 
shrinking to AFN 25,597 million in 2014–15 but bouncing 
back to AFN 232,286 million in 2015–16. However, this 
recovery is still short of the 2013–14 peak, when the 
sector witnessed over nine per cent of growth. In 
2014–15, it shrunk by 1.7 per cent (-1.7 per cent growth), 
and in 2015–16, it grew by less than one per cent (CSO, 
2016).
The total number of registered vehicles amounted 
to 1,866,283 in 2014–15 and increased by one percent 
to 1,887,263 vehicles in 2015–16 (CSO, 2016, p. 211). How-
ever, the total transport of goods decreased from 
11.410 million metric tons in 2014–15 to 9.644 million 
metric tons in 2015–16, and total goods circulation 
dropped from 7,344 million metric tons/km in 2014–15 
to 4,423 million metric tons/km in 2015–16. Transport 
of passenger numbers declined from 249 million in 
2014–15 to 163 million in 2015–16 (CSO, 2016). A similar 
trend occurred in air freight transportation. Afghani-
stan has four international airports and some local 
airports, three of which have asphalt runways. The 
total of goods carried by airplanes decreased from 
2,176 metric tons in 2014–15 to 1,681 metric tons in 
2015–16. On the other hand, the total duration of 
flights increased from 8,646 hours in 2013–14 to 11,988 
hours in 2014–15 and to 12,468 hours in 2015–16. In the 
same period of time, the total distances flown in-
creased from 13,420 million km in 2013–14 to 14,440 
million km in 2014–15 and 14,855 million km in 2015–16 
(CSO, 2016). This indicates an expansion of the area 
covered but, at the same time, a significant drop in 
numbers of passengers and volume of goods carried 
by air.
Employment
Employment in the CIT sector is difficult to assess 
due to the high prevalence of informal businesses. 
The Central Statistics Organization (CSO) of the GIRoA 
not only provides data in its annual statistical year-
book, but also has conducted two surveys of the 
non-agricultural economic activities in Afghanistan, 
which shed light on employment in the CIT business 
in Afghanistan. The Integrated Business Enterprise 
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employees in the CIT sub-sector will be higher than 
the 5.35 per cent of the total labour force indicated by 
the IBES. Last but not least, the rise of unemployment 
and underemployment is not reflected in the above 
surveys. We have to turn to field research findings to 
gain some more insights into the causes of the dete-
rioration in Afghanistan’s economic performance 
from the perspective of actors within the CIT 
sub-sector.
322,912 employees worked in manufacturing, followed 
by trade and repair with 238,640 employees, accom-
modation and food services with 89,046 employees, 
health and social work with 59,287 employees, and 
other unspecified services with the high amount of 
324,118 employees. There were 52,375 (4.44 per cent) 
working in the construction sector and 10,758 (0.91 
per cent) in the transportation and storage section of 
the services sector. On average, establishments in the 
construction sector engaged 10.6 workers, of whom 
only 8.6 were paid. Establishments in the transport 
and storage section employed an average of nine 
workers, of whom only 7.3 were paid.  The annual 
wage per worker was estimated at AFN 36,000 (US 
$686) in the construction sector and AFN 189,000 (US 
$3,603) in the transportation and storage section. The 
average annual wage per worker in all sectors was es-
timated at AFN 51,000 (US $972) (CSO, 2009). The num-
ber of employees grew from 1,179,063 in 2009 to 
1,409,241 in 2015, an increase of around 20 per cent. 
The monthly wages per paid worker increased from 
AFN 4,284 (US $82) in 2009 to AFN 8,083 (US $139). 
Even though the survey does not cover the entire 
construction sector, it estimated that 151 large con-
struction companies (employing ten people or more) 
operated across the country, employing 6,066 (0.4 per 
cent) workers in total. 
The two surveys, with all their weaknesses, some-
what explain the level and structure of business ac-
tivities in the country, and some of their components 
shed light on employment in the CIT sector. However, 
the surveys do not disclose which areas of manufac-
turing, trade and repair work were related to con-
struction and transport, such as mechanics for the 
repair of cars, trucks and construction machinery, 
painters, petrol station staff, casual labour working in 
loading and unloading or road construction workers. 
Like any other economic sector, the transport sector 
also has a large share of its actors engaged in the in-
formal economy, with SMEs sometimes consisting of 
only one person using unregistered vehicles and con-
ducting small-scale transport services, carrying 
goods or passengers. As unregistered SMEs, these 
small transport companies do not pay taxes. Obvious-
ly, if they are included, the number of workers and 
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creating clear paths for delegating authority and re-
sponsibility. Moreover, in some cases a company is es-
tablished not to implement projects but to acquire 
them in order to sell them on to other companies, i.e. 
to act as brokers.
Many construction company managers consider 
corruption as one of the greatest challenges for their 
business. They have experienced corruption in the 
bidding process, in government taxation and in cus-
toms procedures for imports of machinery and equip-
ment. Corruption in the bidding process can take sev-
eral forms. Government officials may leak 
confidential information to a bidder with whom they 
have relations. This might be information about the 
price ceiling for a project or the prices offered by other 
bidders. Some officers give potential tenderers very 
little time to prepare a proposal and the supporting 
documents for a very large project in order to put an 
accomplice at an advantage. As for taxation, company 
managers claim that corruption is rife in Afghan tax 
departments. 
The government officials who are assigned to tax de-
partments are really bad people. They take bribes. Al-
though the procedures for paying taxes are very sim-
ple, if you don’t bribe them, they will create a lot of 
problems for you (Accountant of a small construc-
tion company in Kabul, 2016). 
If the expected bribe is not paid, a corrupt official 
in a tax office will calculate very high taxes for recal-
citrant companies. “The official who comes from the 
government to calculate our tax usually looks for ex-
cuses to put pressure on us by calculating a very high 
tax. He then asks for a bribe to reduce the tax 
amount” (shareholder of a big construction company 
in Kabul, October 2016).
Construction companies usually pay the bribes 
demanded to avoid larger losses.
The decline in demand from international clients 
was the second-largest problem for the construction 
companies interviewed. According to one construc-
tion company owner and former chairperson of the 
Afghan Investment Support Agency in Herat, it forced 
80 percent of the local construction companies to 
close down. In his own company, he had employed 40 
staff until 2013. In 2014, when the internationally 
Construction and transport companies benefited 
significantly from high demand by international 
troops and aid agencies between 2002 and 2012, albeit 
having to operate continuously in a FCAS. Afghan  
entrepreneurs seized the market opportunity and 
founded companies that could thrive on orders from 
international agencies. With hindsight, we can see 
that these companies form a particular element 
within the CIT sub-sector. They are characterized by 
great dependence on international demand, which 
made them grow and then shrink or even close down 
when international demand declined. We shall now 
consider this type of company, exploring the chal-
lenges these firms have faced and analysing the  
rationale by which they adjust their business practices, 
first in construction and then in transportation. 
Doing business in an FCAS:  
Construction companies
In Afghanistan, most construction companies 
have been founded by two or more partners, frequently 
engineers, who join together and apply for a business 
license. The partners are usually family members 
(brothers, father and sons, etc.), friends or at least  
acquaintances. Terms and conditions for sharing 
profits and responsibilities among partners differ 
from one company to another. In some companies, all 
partners have an equal share of capital, equal respon-
sibility and an equal share in profit, while in others 
one partner might have more shares and more re-
sponsibility than the others. There are also companies 
in which the shareholder who manages to acquire a 
project receives a higher share as a reward. Apart 
from these small differences, in most companies, 
ownership and management are not separated. Own-
ers are the managers of the company. Even if separated 
on paper, the owners rarely delegate authority, even 
on very small issues, to company employees. Many 
companies lack a formal hierarchy in which there is 
a clear division of labour and lines of authority and 
responsibility. The reason may be a lack of knowledge 
of professional management practices or a lack of 
trust in employees. Company owners thus tend to 
make all decisions by themselves rather than 
CIT business practices in the context of FCASs: 
Findings from field research
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ernment then had to step in. Family members and 
the Association of Engineers, the head of the provin-
cial council, the chief of police of Herat and elders 
from Farsi district all helped. The commander was 
demanding eight million US dollars, because he 
thought that this was the value of the project. At 
that time, they still used satellite phones. My wife 
played a major role in the negotiations with the kid-
nappers. They finally paid US $20,000 ransom and I 
was released (construction company owner, Herat, 2015).
In this example, local powerholders tried to get a 
share in the assumed lucrative project budget and at-
tempted to enforce their claim through kidnapping 
and demands for ransom. In local conflict contexts, 
there is typically a background for such escalations. 
In this case, the commander used to raise fees from 
Kuchi nomads, who drove their sheep across wooden 
bridges built by the commander. 
He used to take money for himself from the nomads 
for crossing the bridges. Our construction company 
built the new bridge in summer. The original budget 
was US $244,000, but then the project was stopped 
due to the kidnapping, when about 70 per cent had 
been completed. The company got only 50 per cent of 
the payment for the whole construction project from 
the client (construction company owner in Herat, 2015).
As a consequence from this experience of kidnap-
ping, which traumatized the engineer, he preferred to 
carry out construction projects in safe areas. He 
avoided all orders that could bring the company into 
insecure areas and only accepted projects within the 
cities of Kabul, Herat and Kunduz. For security reasons, 
the owner hesitated to make advance investments as 
required by big foreign clients. He feared being held 
liable in the event of destruction of construction ma-
chinery or built objects and considered establishing a 
joint venture with other companies in order to meet 
client requirements, a strategy already applied else-
where (interview with a construction company owner 
in Herat, 2015). Making up-front investments is not 
only a difficult challenge for many company owners 
operating in risky areas but also a problem for Afghan 
construction companies due to limited or no access 
to credit and the lack of affordable bank loans. 
funded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) closed, 
nine employees were left, and in 2015 only three. He 
said:
The PRT provided the largest projects in construction. 
Their closure has caused major damage to all compa-
nies, because they all have invested in machinery for 
road building. After three or four years, these ma-
chines will be rotten (interview, 2015).
From the perspective of employees, the loss of 
jobs is central: “As long as we have no projects, our 
company will not flourish and may employ even fewer 
workers” (employee of a small construction company, 
Kabul, 2016).
Most company owners mentioned the economic 
challenges first and then elaborated on insecurity: 
“Security is very important for our projects. We have 
some projects in provinces where security is not good 
and we are facing a lot of challenges in implement-
ing those projects” (engineer of a small construction 
company, Kabul, 2016). 
Insecurity is not limited to project sites. Company 
owners do not even feel safe in cities or at home. 
“There are many security issues. Even some company 
owners are afraid for their lives. They have been 
threatened with kidnapping or killed if they did not 
pay the money” (employee of a small construction 
company, Kabul, 2016).
An engineer owning a construction company  
reported a case of kidnapping which had a large im-
pact on the company. The description sheds some 
light on the perception of insecurity and its effects 
on a business. 
In 2005, our company had a bridge construction project 
in Farsi district. It was a project instigated by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
and funded by the Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT). A commander, who was linked to Ismail Khan 
[a former ‘warlord’, governor and, in 2005, Minister 
of Water and Energy in Herat], started—in collabo-
ration with the chief of police of Farsi district—to 
demand money from the company, US $200,000, as a 
condition for gaining permission to carry out the 
project. I told him that the project was not so big. 
Then the commander kidnapped me while I was mon-
itoring the construction project. The provincial gov-
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Insecurity is not the only reason preventing con-
struction companies from expanding their operations 
to the entire country. Many do not have the financial 
capability to do so. Construction projects need con-
siderable investment in machinery, equipment, con-
struction material, salaries and labour, costs of ad-
ministration and government guarantees for bid 
deposits. 18 The return on these investments usually 
takes a very long time so that companies have to up-
front investments and wait until they receive the 
payment for their services from the clients. A further 
reason preventing companies from expanding their 
operations has been the decrease in profits due to the 
declining demand for infrastructure and construc-
tion services. However, some construction companies 
simply lack the capacity to manage several projects 
simultaneously and thus do not expand operations. 
Whereas many companies in the sample have 
failed, made losses, or avoided operating in insecure 
areas, some companies have been able to cope with 
the difficult environment in the country and imple-
mented projects in risky areas. Their most common 
security strategies have been paying off Taliban,  
government officials or other local power holders,  
recruiting security guards or partnering with influ-
ential persons (Shirzad, 2016). Since 2014, companies 
are required to hire armed guards through the Afghan 
Public Protection Force (APPF), which is now officially 
in charge of security throughout Afghanistan. 19 Con-
struction companies can use guards sent by the APPF 
or introduce guards whom they trust to the APPF, 
which will then recruit these proposed candidates 
and train them and deploy them to the construction 
project. However, for those companies that want to 
have their own choice of guards and take this path, a 
long time is needed to complete the procedures, 
18 \  The government guarantee is “a specified sum of money, which a bid-
der is asked to deposit with the procuring entity as a guarantee that 
the bidder will, if selected, sign the contract as per his bid/ offer. A bid-
der who fails to sign the contract forfeits the amount of the deposit“ 
(Ministry of Finance, 2011).
19 \  Based on presidential decree 44, the APPF, a state-owned enterprise 
since 2014, is in charge of supplying security services to companies. Its 
biggest shareholder is the Ministry of Finance; further shareholders 
are the Ministry of Interior and the ministries of petroleum, water and 
power, urban development, public works, and economy. The APPF is 
funded by the company receiving its security services and pays the 
wages for all its security guards (interview with APPF head of department).
Insecurity also affects the options of Afghan con-
struction companies when it comes to expanding 
their range of operation. Many company owners are 
not ready to bid for projects in insecure provinces 
and districts, especially in locations far from their 
own regions, where it is difficult for them to establish 
contacts with local power holders or armed opposi-
tion groups such as the Taliban. 
Construction companies have to pay considerable 
amounts of money while working in Taliban-domi-
nated areas. If the local Taliban are not paid, they 
burn machinery, attack project personnel and plant 
mines. They usually have very accurate information 
about the budget and scope of the project. Taliban 
may either directly come and request money or first 
blow up some machinery or attack personnel to show 
their existence in the area. Deals with Taliban are 
not uniform; they differ in modes of payments, time 
of payments, nature of intermediaries and amounts 
of payment. Their deals sometimes have a special ter-
minology. For instance, the Dari term ‘Dah Yaka’, 
which means ten percent, is not unknown to con-
struction companies working in insecure areas; it is 
the percentage of the project budget that Taliban 
usually ask for (Shirzad, 2016, p. 28). 
Besides the Taliban, sub-national level government 
officials, police commanders and local powerholders, 
but also violent gangs and kidnappers, pose threats to 
companies in some areas and demand payments. As a 
consequence, some company owners confine their 
activities to limited geographic areas because they do 
not want to become well-known elsewhere and attract 
the attention of violent actors. Moreover, many busi-
nessmen—along with many other citizens—have lost 
confidence in the state. Several interview partners 
said that they had believed the government would 
not survive 2014 and that the Taliban would return to 
power. The uncertain political situation played a role 
in company owners’ decision to cut back, rather than 
expand their operations. Only those who have strong 
backing from politicians and high-ranking govern-
ment officials can afford to expand their businesses 
and avoid security threats.
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planning and professional staff. The head of the com-
pany acts as company president, usually with two 
vice presidents, and below them is the management 
running the daily operations. As in construction 
companies, the transport company leadership often 
consists of close relatives, such as brothers or cousins, 
and relatives also hold key positions in site manage-
ment, assisted by professional staff. Many transport 
companies of this type ship goods of every kind, de-
pending on demand, but some specialize in carrying 
particular commodities.
Medium-sized transport companies, consisting of 
five or fewer persons, are typically organized as fol-
lows: “Our company has a boss and two clerks, who 
are permanent staff. The core structure of our compa-
ny are these three people and, along with these, we 
have some 20 workers who load and unload trucks on 
a per truck wage basis” (interview with the owner of 
a medium-sized transport company in Kabul, 2015). 
Our company has a very simple structure … It has a 
director and two clerks. It doesn’t have any more 
staff, but when we want to load vehicles in order to 
drive goods to other provinces like Kabul, Herat, 
Laghman, Mazar-e Sharif and Kunduz we pay work-
ers on the base of a daily wage. … We export and im-
port goods from Pakistan, secondly we take goods to 
Nangarhar and other provinces or parts of Afghani-
stan (interview with a transport company owner in 
Nangarhar, 2015).
Very few transport companies in the sample were 
founded before 2001, and all the large companies had 
started very small, often with only one vehicle carry-
ing goods for other transport companies. Over the  
period of high demand (2002-2012), the owners bought 
more trucks or buses and often had further vehicles 
on ‘stand-by’. When the owners get a contract, they 
call the drivers of the ‘stand-by’ vehicles, who will 
then load and transport the goods on their own ac-
count. Prices are set so that the drivers can start work 
immediately. Their wages are similar to those of the 
companies’ employees (interviews with owners of 
large transport companies in Kabul and Herat, 2015 
and 2016). 
Many large Afghan transport companies worked 
for the ISAF and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
whereas the APPF guards are immediately available 
(interview with the head of department of the APPF, 
Kabul, 2016). 
So to sum up, besides the financial challenges 
arising from shrinking demand, construction compa-
nies also face serious challenges in terms of demands 
for extra payments from power holders ranging from 
Taliban or commanders of other NSAGs to local polit-
ical leaders and government officers. If the companies 
do not pay, they can become victims of violent assaults. 
The main strategies of companies are avoidance of 
this type of insecurity or compliance with the various 
conditions imposed by the powerholders. In the latter 
case, they become a source of income for a power-
holder or corrupt state official and involuntarily have 
a stabilizing effect on the status quo.  If they deploy 
security guards, these can protect the construction 
sites as long as local NSAGs do not start seriously at-
tacking them. Having experienced this several times, 
some companies prefer to hire local inhabitants as 
security guards even if the procedure takes longer 
(Shirzad, 2016). However, it is not unusual for a local 
group to destroy the newly constructed road or build-
ing after the company and its guards have left the site, 
underscoring the need to engage in negotiations 
with local leaders beforehand. 
Transport companies
The structures of transport companies are similar 
to those described for construction companies above. 
Whereas many smaller companies limit operations 
to Afghanistan, others have branches in Pakistan. As 
the owner of a large transport company with their 
main office in Jalalabad city explained:
The owner of the company is also the director or head 
of the company. I also have an assistant and four 
clerks. We have a cleaner, who cooks as well. Our 
company has many branches both in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. We have branches in Kabul, Peshawar, 
Lahore and Faisal Abad. Each office has a head and 
two clerks, except in Faisal Abad, where we have only 
one clerk (interview, Kabul, 2015). 
A few large transport companies have established 
their own management system with operational 
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coming years are to export and import commodities 
internationally. We will be providing services beyond 
the borders of Afghanistan. Moreover, we are searching 
for opportunities outside the country, because these 
days our business is getting weaker day by day. We 
need to either expand our business outside Afghani-
stan or entirely transfer the whole business to Dubai 
(interview, 2015). 
For companies that have grown into large-scale 
businesses during the boom period, such options may 
be viable. For many other companies that were thriv-
ing until 2014, they are not. One transport company 
owner in Herat explained:
I had a contract with the Americans in Shuridan dis-
trict. We got US $1,000 for each truck moving from 
Herat to Kandahar and US $4,000 for transporting 
one vehicle. From Herat to Bagram and Kabul, we 
were paid US $10,000. Now this work does not exist 
anymore. … Now we are only transporting goods for 
shopkeepers. We have to heavily overload the trucks, 
which damages the vehicles. It is difficult to survive 
(interview, 2015).
Some transport company owners have tried to 
sell their vehicles and move into the domestic market 
with a small fleet of trucks, which they often over-
load in order to make business more profitable. These 
profits are short-term, because overloading entails 
the need for frequent truck maintenance and hence, 
more costs. This problem is exacerbated by bad road 
conditions, a matter of much complaint by company 
owners and drivers. Moreover, as newcomers in the 
domestic market, these companies face high compe-
tition from those who have long been established in 
this market. A logistics officer of a small transport 
company in Kabul, which was founded in 2011, ex-
plained how the company adjusted to the shrinking 
demand as follows:
In its initial years, the company got some very big 
contracts from foreign forces here in Afghanistan, 
and you could say that the company was at its peak, 
but once the foreigners left, the business got kind of 
stuck. So the owner decided that it was time for a 
change in company strategy. He purchased two buses 
and started operating passenger services from Kabul 
to Kunduz and Kunduz to Kabul, then changed to the 
(NATO) forces until 2014. As one owner of such a com-
pany explained: 
The reason why transport companies were working 
for the foreigners was because they were paying a lot 
of money. My company was transporting fuel for 
them to various army bases. In our contract with 
them they were obliged to pay compensation if any of 
our trucks were damaged by the insurgent groups as 
part of an insurance package (interview, Kabul, 2015). 
Another company owner described the impact of 
the withdrawal of foreign troops and agencies: 
We have not seen new people entering the transport 
sector. The main reason is that previously, there used 
to be a lot of contracts for the transport sector and 
people could earn a lot of money, but now it is the 
other way around and a lot of the people who used to 
have big transport companies have now closed their 
companies … From 2004 to 2010 everyone wanted to 
invest in transport. During that time a lorry would 
cost US $70,000, but now the same lorry will cost US 
$40,000. And we must understand that the reduction 
in the price of a lorry means that there is less work, 
and less work means less profit. So why would any-
one decide to invest in that business? I say the trans-
port sector is in decline (interview, Kabul, 2015). 
A further transport company owner stated:
I have not seen new people in three years investing in 
the transport sector. Moreover, their decision not to 
invest in Afghanistan seems logical to me, because 
they know that the rate of return in businesses has 
become critically low here, and now they cannot earn 
as much money as they used to earn before. More im-
portantly, they know that their money and invest-
ment cannot be safe here and they have the fear of 
losing their money (interview in Kabul, 2015). 
These statements indicate that the combination 
of fewer contracts, expected low returns on invest-
ment and increased uncertainty with regard to eco-
nomic stability has caused stagnation or decline in 
the transport sector. There are some exceptions, how-
ever, as the statement by a transport company man-
ager in Kabul shows: 
We transport goods to camps and government sites. 
Some years ago, we had many contracts with NATO, 
ISAF and the European Union. Our plans for the 
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international customers slumped, those companies 
that had not been dependent on international demand 
continued to do profitable business. 
Some companies specialize in importing particu-
lar goods, such as fuel, oil, petrol, liquid gas, etc., 
mainly from Turkmenistan or Iran, or commodities 
from Pakistan. To this end, they have their own large 
fleet of trucks (ranging between 60 and 400 in the 
sample). These importers have an important role in 
the transport sector. They not only ship commodities 
from neighbouring countries to Afghanistan, but also 
have storage facilities, tanks and truck parks within 
the country and invest in these sites. They build feeder 
roads to access their sites, infrastructure, such as water 
pipes and electricity, and sometimes even a clinic; 
they buy trucks and may also run small factories. 
Such large companies also buy urban land and build 
houses. Besides transporting goods, they lease trucks 
to clients or even to drivers who will become owners 
of these trucks later on. These companies are chiefly 
wholesalers of products that domestic transport com-
panies then distribute to retailers or, in the case of 
fuel, directly to petrol stations, other enterprises or 
households. Challenges facing transport companies 
with regional business are naturally more related to 
the conditions in neighbouring countries and at in-
ternational borders than those facing construction 
companies or hauliers carrying goods only inside Af-
ghanistan (for details, see Grawert et al., 2017a). 
Most of the transport company owners and man-
agers in the sample agreed that the main problem in 
transport was corruption. Bribes and other payments 
are required at numerous check points where the 
companies have to deal with various corrupt govern-
ment entities, especially police officers, customs duty 
officers and officials from the tax department of the 
Ministry of Finance. Referring to corruption at the 
tax department, one company owner explained the 
problem in detail. He said that the income calcula-
tion for a company is supposed to be based on the real 
margin of AFN 25 for an imported unit of 1 kilo-
gramme of gas that is sold for AFN 30 to wholesalers. 
However, the tax department will calculate the final 
sale price of AFN 48 raised by local distributers per 
kilogramme, and demand tax payment for the 
route from Kabul to Nangarhar and Torkham and 
vice versa, providing services to the southern provinc-
es. The company is now providing both human and 
material transportation services in Kabul and some 
provinces (interview, 2016). 
So the loss of orders from international forces has 
forced company owners to find clients in the domes-
tic market and to diversify their services. 
The examples show that transport businesses 
had been attracted by the opportunity for high profits 
as international demand boomed. Many of them had 
changed their customer base in favour of the foreign 
forces, while others were established to serve this 
high demand. They did not shy away from the risk  
attached to supplying international forces, which in-
creased as the Taliban retrenched from the mid-2000s. 
According to the head of the Association for Drivers 
and Transport Companies and Vehicle Owners in 
Herat, which had 42 member transport companies, 
its members lost 687 vehicles from 2013 to 2015 due to 
attacks on route, and 264 persons working for Herati 
transport companies were killed, some being targeted 
by Taliban as they shipped coal for ISAF.
Insecurity was a major reason why some company 
owners deliberately avoided supplying the interna-
tional troops and agencies. They did not want to  
become a target for Taliban. Those companies focused 
their business on local Afghan customers, despite 
earning lower profits than those companies supply-
ing international customers, or they moved into 
cross-border trade, bringing food and household 
products from Pakistan to Afghanistan. A company 
owner in Kabul explained, 
Equipment coming from Pakistan into Afghanistan 
with legal documents is the main commodity we ship 
to other provinces across Afghanistan. We ship all 
kinds of equipment to all the provinces of Afghani-
stan. We mainly work for Afghan businessmen and 
traders who have purchased goods in other countries 
and want those goods to be delivered to a specific lo-
cation (interview, 2015).
Several transport companies indirectly supplied 
the internationals, selling goods to other transport 
companies, which then delivered them to the for-
eigners. At the time when the orders of the 
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summarized: “The government should finish corrup-
tion, traffic problems, road problems, police problems, 
and then the transport sector will be good for invest-
ment,” and added, “the government should ban those 
transport companies which don’t pay tax or don’t 
have permission from the ministry of transport” (in-
terview, 2015). 
In fact, the Ministry of Transport and Civil Avia-
tion (MoTCA) does regulate the private transport sec-
tor, collecting fees from trucks and buses at national 
and provincial borders and on the outskirts of major 
cities. The above statement alludes not only to the 
large number of unregistered SMEs that are also part 
of the transport sector but do not pay taxes, but also 
to registered companies that get away without or 
with less payment. Company owners labelled these 
‘mafia companies’, because they thrive on their special 
relationships with the government. They enjoy cus-
toms exemptions or reductions, thus distorting com-
petition with other private transport companies in 
the sector. The ‘mafia companies’ demand a lower 
price for their products and still make more profit.  
A company owner gave the example of a ‘mafia com-
pany’ that had saved about US $33,300 in custom-free 
trade permission due to its particular relationships 
with foreign governments. As military equipment 
and aid donations are exempted from taxation, some 
companies can make use of this framework to ship 
gas and other commodities across the border, pre-
tending that they are military supplies or donations. 
This is a major challenge for  large companies in-
volved in cross-border trade, because it distorts prices. 
For company owners, it is difficult to identify those 
hauliers, who often are individuals, not companies. 
Their ploys lower the prices, and this seriously affects 
the profit margin for ‘honest’ companies (interviews 
with large transport companies conducting 
cross-border trade, Herat, 2016).
Like construction companies, large transport 
companies have sites for their trucks and offices at 
the margins of towns in several parts of Afghanistan. 
Especially in Kabul, the companies are facing the 
problem of land grabbing by influential individuals 
and, in particular, Members of Parliament. In fact it is 
a problem that affects many citizens (Mielke & 
difference of AFN 23. The tax officer will just ignore 
the fact that the gas was sold by the company at the 
wholesale and not the retail price. But once the of-
ficer has receives a bribe, he will calculate the tax re-
alistically. Moreover, if the company does not pay a 
bribe, the officer will delay the process. This causes 
problems for the company, because it needs the an-
nual extension of the business license, which will 
only be done after taxes have been paid. Delays in the 
taxation bureaucracy lead to the expiry of the license, 
with the result that trucks will be held back at the 
customs. So company managers have to calculate 5 to 
10 per cent of the final price of cargo for the monthly 
bribe demanded by the tax officers. The manager ex-
plained that this bribe is not demanded secretively 
and paid ‘under the table’. Rather, the officers voice 
their demands in public, shouting in a company of-
fice when it is full of customers, ‘You have to give me 
the money for my expenses!’ As soon as the officer 
has received the bribe, he will prepare a proper docu-
ment without delay. The manager added: “During the 
rule of Karzai, tax collectors were still ashamed, but 
now they are not. The officer will say, ‘If you don’t like 
it, go and complain!’, but companies will not get any 
support from the government to protect them” (in-
terview with a transport company manager in Herat, 
2015).
Another challenge for transport companies 
comes from the irregular demands by police officers, 
as illustrated by the experience of a company owner 
in Kabul: 
We are facing a lot of traffic problems. The traffic po-
lice illegally take money from lorry drivers on the 
roads, and when our drivers need permission to enter 
the city, the police again make a heavy charge on our 
drivers. In Kabul, especially in Pul Charkhi, the traf-
fic police and the Afghan National Police (ANP) 
force us to wait for a long time, but once you’ve paid 
them the money, they don’t let you get delayed for 
even a second (interview, 2015).
Transport company owners considered corrupt 
government authorities as the main uncertainty they 
had to face because the payments and their frequen-
cy were unpredictable and made transport services 
very costly. A transport company owner in Kabul 
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Taliban or local people, sometimes dressed in police 
uniforms, was a problem that had occurred to them-
selves or their acquaintances. Due to the abuse of uni-
forms by criminals, drivers cannot trust the police, as 
men in police uniforms may be Taliban or local crim-
inals. They tend to trust the army more. A ransom 
payment to kidnappers could amount to US $100,000. 
In some cases, Taliban would call the company owner 
and demand a ‘tax’ payment (interviews with owners 
of transport companies in Herat in 2015 and 2016).
On the road between Mazar-e Sharif and 
Hairatan at the border between Afghanistan and  
Uzbekistan, Taliban usually stop truck drivers on the 
highway and inquire about the freight and client. A 
truck driver reported:
We said that this vehicle is from a private company. 
If they find out that the tanker is delivering govern-
ment oil or ISAF oil, they won’t let us live for a sec-
ond.  … I always try to keep my distance from the na-
tional army vehicles and police cars, and sometimes 
when I see the international security forces I try my 
best to go a different way, or to go a bit later (inter-
view, Mazar-e Sharif, 2017).
This statement points to the risk transport com-
panies face if they have clients from the international 
troops or the Afghan government who want to have 
commodities shipped through Taliban areas. The 
trucks of hauliers working for these clients, as well as 
private companies operating on their behalf, are targets 
for direct armed attacks. Many companies therefore 
decline assignments for the government or foreign 
clients. The insecurity caused by armed conflict in  
Afghanistan has serious impacts on transport com-
panies: drivers injured and sometimes killed and  
vehicles damaged or destroyed. As a consequence, 
company managers report that they have cancelled 
plans to expand and open more sites, while some 
even consider moving some of their offices and sites 
abroad to Dubai or Iran (interviews with owner of 
large transport company in Herat, 2015). 
In response to these types of security risks, com-
pany managers have developed a range of risk mitiga-
tion strategies. Through the most insecure areas, 
trucks move in convoys, accompanied by military 
Grawert, 2016). Companies are affected differently 
from ordinary households, because the conflict  
dynamics related to land seizure have an impact on 
their business. The manager of a transport company 
site in Kabul explained that the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industries had allocated land to companies in an 
industrial area of Kabul, and that the land transaction 
had been approved by the government. The companies 
had built the feeder roads either themselves or by 
paying contractors. When this work had been com-
pleted, the justice section of the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industries claimed that the property document 
was not properly done. The company then sued the 
Ministry and got the land back legally – however, 
about one and a half years later. The company’s busi-
ness was delayed by this period. The manager sum-
marized the situation, saying, “If Afghan businessmen 
have land, the government will put up legal hurdles” 
(interview, 2016).
Large companies operating all over the country 
have to face violence and take precautions. Most of 
them protect their sites, vehicles and staff through 
security guards and mobile security teams. If they get 
a contract to operate and transport goods to an inse-
cure area, they usually hire a person originating from 
that area to accompany the tour. Landmines are one 
of the security threats, alongside ambushes, that face 
trucks moving through areas and roads under control 
of the Taliban. A company owner stated: “War busi-
ness keeps the war going. People are paid US $1,000 to 
place a mine on a road” (interview with large transport 
company owner in Herat, 2016). 
In western Afghanistan, there are some highly 
insecure routes: about 45 km on the road between the 
Turkmenistan-Afghan border and Herat, starting 
15 km from the border in Herat province; the Farah 
road about 150 km south-south-east of Herat; Ghorian 
district crossing at the Iranian border; and many sec-
tions of the Kabul-Kandahar road. Areas where the 
ISAF coalition forces were located also caused insecu-
rity for transport companies, because their presence 
and visible Afghan suppliers could provoke Taliban 
attacks. Several company owners reported that the 
kidnapping of Afghan businessmen and drivers by 
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resolves our internal problems, and we resolve prob-
lems with the government by ourselves. We know 
that without paying off government officials the 
problems are not going to be resolved” (interview in 
Jalalabad, 2015). 
Another company owner explained how compa-
nies overcome the shortcomings of the union in 
practice, saying: 
It is only a union by name, since we have not seen 
any activity from it. When we face a problem, we pre-
fer to resolve it through our own connections or with 
money. When we are faced with a robbery or any oth-
er such problems, then we will call some transporters 
and form a Jirga (council-like meeting) to resolve our 
problem (interview, Kabul, 2015). 
The survey indicates that company owners hardly 
see a solution to their common problems coming 
through formal organizations. Rather, they either 
stick to long-established methods of locally organized 
conflict resolution, solving the problem by using net-
works headed by influential personalities, or just pay..
escorts (army protection is free). The drivers are in-
structed to keep driving during daylight and avoid 
dangerous routes. Companies said they would not 
make any contracts directly with the coalition forces, 
international donors, agencies, or NGOs, but operate 
through sub-contractors. Moreover, those who regu-
larly use the same routes make sure that they are 
well-known in the communities and put efforts into 
building and maintaining an image of being far re-
moved from any connections with non-state armed 
groups. In the event of kidnappings, company owners 
consider it least risky to stay connected with the kid-
nappers and fulfil their demands. If Taliban or others 
demand ‘tax’ payments through phone calls, company 
owners said they would first try not to respond. If 
nothing happens, the company managers will know 
that the Taliban are not fully in control of the road. If 
the calls continue and are accompanied by threats, 
the owners will occasionally pay. Moreover, the owners 
of most large companies employ personal security 
guards to protect themselves and their family mem-
bers. A further risk mitigation strategy has been to 
hire unskilled daily labourers from local communities 
for loading and as security guards whenever possible 
(interviews with transport company owners and 
managers in Kabul and Herat, 2016).
As an indirect strategy of risk mitigation, some 
company owners invest in measures that will benefit 
the local communities. They provide their workers 
with extra food and security guards with TV and 
household utensils to keep them loyal. Further 
trust-building measures to protect the company in-
clude donations to charities or directly to the local 
community or funding the building of schools, public 
facilities and mosques (interview with the manager 
of a transport company in Kabul, 2016).
As representatives of the interests of transport 
companies, owners have formed transport industry 
associations across Afghanistan. However, the research 
findings indicate that these associations, or ‘unions’, 
do not voice the main interests of the companies to 
the government and are obviously not powerful 
enough to curb corruption. As one transport company 
owner put it: “We have a union and its head … 
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Number and type of employees depend on the number 
and type of projects the company has secured. There 
are, however, also some large, professionally structured 
companies that have stable orders for construction or 
infrastructure work and are therefore in a position to 
conclude long-term formal contracts with employees, 
who are organized in departments and units. 
The bulk of employees in Afghan construction 
companies are young (15–35 years old). However, private 
construction companies do not tend to be the first 
choice of qualified job-seeking youth, as many young 
people do not see a future for themselves in the local 
companies. They can be fired any time when the 
company does not have orders for work. The relatively 
low salaries and poor benefits and the lack of job  
security in Afghan construction companies make 
working for the government, NGOs and UN organiza-
tions more attractive. 
Recruitment
Recruitment of employees and workers in the 
construction sub-sector rarely follows formal proce-
dures. Announcement of vacancies is not a common 
practice: “If we needed to announce, we would defi-
nitely do so. But we have not announced any vacan-
cies yet because we haven’t really felt a need for it” 
(owner of a medium-sized construction company in 
Kabul, 2016).
An officer of another construction company in 
Kabul said: “Whenever we have a vacancy and need 
to hire someone, we invite our relatives and people 
we know for an interview. The head of the company 
then does the interviews and selects one of them for 
the position” (interview in Kabul, 2016). 
Apart from the very few big and professionally 
structured companies where hiring goes through a 
formal process, in most companies it is the owner or 
major shareholder of the company who decides 
which person is to be hired and which one not:  “In 
our company, it is the managing director who has the 
authority to hire and fire people; other staff do not  
really have anything to do with this” (interview with 
an employee of a medium-sized construction compa-
ny in Kabul, 2016). 
Field research findings suggest that employment 
differs between urban and rural areas. Relationships, 
money and connections are crucial to getting work 
with construction and transport companies that 
have projects in urban areas. Usually company owners 
or managers will call friends and family members to 
find, from these circles, the right persons to join the 
company. There is no standard procedure for hiring 
and employing people. As the owner of a medium- 
sized construction company said: “Our company is 
not a big company and we don’t need to announce  
vacancies in the media, so we try to hire our friends 
and relatives. We know them and they know us, and 
it makes our job easier” (interview in Kabul, 2015). In 
rural areas, employment is mostly geared to the require- 
ment of a specific project and arrangements made on 
a short-term basis. An employer of a construction 
company explained:
Whenever we need to implement a project in a rural 
area, we hire all the labourers and workers from that 
specific area because it costs us less money. At the 
same time, we would send in our technical team from 
the center because it is very difficult to find technical 
experts in the rural areas of Afghanistan”(interview 
with the owner of a construction company in Kabul, 2015). 
There are further differences in employment 
practice between construction and transport compa-
nies, which will be discussed separately below.
Employment strategies of construction 
companies
A typical registered construction company in  
Afghanistan employs at least one engineer, some 
skilled foremen, assistant engineers, skilled labourers, 
administrative and finance officers, a guard, a cleaner, 
and a cook. These employees constitute the core staff 
of the companies. The company managers usually try 
their best to retain the core employees for as long as 
possible and provide them with a permanent status. 
When companies get a contract for a construction or 
infrastructure project, they will add workers to the 
core staff according to the project budget. Hence,  
employment in construction companies is volatile. 
Employment in the context of FCASs:  
Findings from field research
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implement the project under tighter protection. As 
this would have been very expensive, the company 
owner re-started the project with a new strategy. The 
company sent a delegation, which consisted of the 
vice president and the company field supervisor, to 
discuss the issue with the local tribal elders. He 
reported: 
One of the local tribal elders said that they were all 
poor people and the government was doing nothing 
for them. Other elders added that during the last 14 
years, the government had only built one school and 
a few culverts for them. Moreover, it had asphalted 
only one road. The elders told our company delegation 
that from their perspective, the company and the 
government were the same. They would threaten our 
company in the same way they were threatening the 
government, because our company was working for 
the government. Then the local tribal elders proposed 
two options to the delegation: First, if our company 
was to asphalt the road that ran through their vil-
lage, it should hire all the workers needed from the 
village. Young people there were available and jobless. 
The elders claimed that the government was doing 
nothing for their youth or any other villagers. They 
were not providing them with jobs. They said that 
the only way to let us work in this area was to hire 
local youth for implementation of the works. The sec-
ond option they offered the company delegation was 
to give the local elders a cash payment. They said 
they would take the money and distribute it, in front 
of the delegation, to all the households in their area. 
The tribal elders promised the company delegates 
that if they accepted any of these options, they would 
ensure full security for the construction team during 
road building. They also promised that insurgent 
groups would not disturb the team while working in 
that area. The company delegation came back to Kabul, 
and after several meetings, we decided to hire the 
workers from that area to implement the project,  
because that was the safer and cheaper option. Once 
we had hired the local youth, the project progressed 
very smoothly and nothing happened until its com-
pletion (interview with construction company owner, 
Kabul, 2015).
Some owners or company directors do delegate 
this staff recruitment role to the manager of the  
department to which the employee is being recruited 
or to the administration or human resource depart-
ment. In the end, however, the responsible officers 
will have to attain the consent for the selection of 
employees from the owner or director.
Nepotism—the recruitment of relatives and ac-
quaintances—is very common throughout the con-
struction industry. In interviews, the company owners 
openly communicate this practice: “If I tell you the 
truth, most of our employees are my relatives, except 
in the engineering department” (interview with a 
construction company manager in Kabul, 2016).
These practices hold for recruitment of white collar 
staff, whereas unskilled labourers are mostly hired at 
the project location and from nearby districts and 
provinces. This is particularly common among com-
panies that implement projects in conflict-affected 
and remote areas of Afghanistan, as the following  
example shows in some detail. The engineer of a con-
struction company and his team visited a site in the 
Set-e Kandow area of Paktia Province, where a road 
was to be built. The company started working the 
very next day. They brought in their machinery, 
which was very expensive and had been imported 
from abroad by the company owners. The engineer 
explained what happened next:
During the first day of the work, the field supervisor 
got a warning letter from an unknown source telling 
the company to hire the local people of the village or 
leave the area. The supervisor informed the higher 
authorities of the company, who treated the matter 
very lightly. On the following day the tribal elders of 
that community came to the area and talked with 
the field supervisor about the same issue, and again 
nothing happened from the company side. Finally the 
local people of the area attacked the company’s workers 
and machinery, resulting in the killing of two company 
security guards and the burning of almost all the  
machinery that could be found on the site on that 
particular day (interview with a construction company 
owner, Kabul, 2015). 
In response, the company owner first planned to 
hire a higher number of security guards and to 
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They prefer to hire smart people irrespective of their 
education, because these people do not demand high 
remuneration from the company, yet do an almost 
similar job [as higher paid qualified staff] ... for  
example, in our company, we have an employee 
named Abdul Shokor. He is only a 12th grade school 
leaver but a very smart person. He is responsible for 
government-related issues. He is very good at acquir-
ing project money from the government. If a person 
isn’t smart enough, he won’t be able to acquire the 
money in months. Abdul has established really good 
connections at the Ministry of Finance which help him 
get his job done very easily (interview in Kabul, 2016).
The main reason for employing semi-qualified 
staff is that highly educated employees will demand 
higher salaries. Moreover, company owners do not 
generally have any confidence in the quality of edu-
cation offered at private universities. What employers 
may find more important than formal qualifications 
is the social skill needed to create and use relation-
ships with influential persons, as the example reveals.
Working time
Labourers in construction usually have to work 
for very long hours and very often without being paid 
for the overtime. The labour law of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Afghanistan prohibits over 40 hours of work per 
week on average, but in practice companies rarely  
observe the law, as the following example shows:
I used to work for nine hours a day for my previous 
employer. Even though our working hours are set 
from 7:00 in the morning till 5:00 in the evening here, 
now I often work for longer hours without receiving 
any payment for the overtime. However, we are some-
times paid a little more than our agreed salaries at 
the end of the month (interview with a skilled  
labourer of a construction company in Kabul, 2016). 
Moreover, very few labourers make use of the 
right to holidays given to them under the law. Many 
companies only give them Friday off as their 
weekend. 
“I don’t have any formal holidays in this company. 
However, I secretly leave for home for a night once 
every 15 to 20 days and come back in the morning. I 
This example is typical for many rural areas in 
Afghanistan, although local features may vary, de-
pending on the power relations prevailing. It shows 
how urgently young people need employment, so that 
the elders—in cooperation with the District Develop-
ment Assembly20—will not hesitate to mobilize their 
community to fight for this aim and to commit acts 
of sabotage if a company does not respond adequately. 
Companies report that, in relatively less insecure 
urban areas, blue collar workers with some acquired 
skills are available. This pertains especially to the 
eastern provinces, where there are many returnees 
from Pakistan who have gained useful skills from 
working there. “Some companies even mention in 
their tender that masons should come from Nuristan 
Province or from Pakistan, because they know that 
these people offer quality services” (interview with 
an employee of a medium-size construction company 
in Kabul, 2016). 
Jobs also used to go to skilled labourers and pro-
fessionals originating from neighbouring countries, 
especially Pakistan, because these people were re-
garded as providing better service and demanding 
less remuneration than their Afghan counterparts. 
However, since 2014, recruitment of Pakistanis has 
declined in response to new government policies  
favouring Afghans, diplomatic tensions and border 
closures between Afghanistan and Pakistan (see also 
Grawert et al., 2017a). A considerable number of la-
bourers are Pashtuns who come from the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan yet mostly 
identify themselves as Afghans. Besides Pakistanis, a 
number of engineers and technical personnel from 
India, Nepal, the Philippines and Europe also work in 
construction companies.
Many company owners do not, however, give 
much consideration to the qualification and educa-
tional background of job applicants. They rather fo-
cus on finding smart people who can get the work 
done for them with ease, as the following statement 
by an employee of a construction company illustrates. 
20 \  District Development Assemblies were introduced as a local structure 
under the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development as part of 
the National Solidarity Programme in 2006. Most of the members are 
elected by community development councils, some are appointed by 
officials (Anwarzay, 2011).
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in the payment issues of them. They deal with it 
themselves. We don’t ask about their working hours, 
the quality of their work or the size of salary they get, 
we only deal with the person to whom we have given 
that particular contract” (interview with the manager 
of a medium-sized construction company in Kabul, 2016).
Sometimes companies fail to pay salaries and 
wages to their employees on time because of delays 
in payments by the government or the international 
donor organization that contracted them. 
There is no systematic approach to training or 
HR development. Some companies conduct trainings 
for their managerial or administrative staff but not 
for the skilled or unskilled labourers. In some situa-
tions, especially when working at army bases, embas-
sies and other security or diplomatic premises, com-
panies are required by clients, in their role as a donor 
or investor, to follow certain rules. 
When we bring in construction materials, they first 
test the quality and then we get the permission to 
use it. Or some embassies, for example, have a strict 
policy on working hours that we have to follow; 
everyone has to be inside the premise by 8:00 a.m. 
and out of it by 4:00 p.m. exactly. And there are vari-
ous other rules that we have to follow (interview with 
an employee of a medium-sized construction compa-
ny in Kabul, 2016). 
The companies under contract are required to 
train their employees to obey these rules and regula-
tions. “Once, we had a project inside an ISAF camp 
where we needed to follow certain rules. We had to 
train our project staff to ensure they complied” (in-
terview with a medium-sized construction company 
owner in Kabul, 2016). 
Most of the company owners reason that their 
employees are sufficiently well-qualified and do not 
need any kind of training: “We haven’t provided any 
trainings yet. So far the workers have done the job 
correctly and we really haven’t felt any need for train-
ing” (interview with a medium-sized construction 
company owner in Kabul, 2016). 
A few companies do provide trainings to their 
employees, whether for administrative staff or 
labourers. 
have made a rota for the people under my command 
so that each of them can leave for their home every 15 
days (interview with the security commander of a 
large construction company in Kabul, 2016).
In spite of the poor labour conditions, most workers 
said they felt privileged by at least having a job and 
did not, therefore, take steps to change their job or 
ask for better conditions. “A lot of my friends are job-
less. They really look hard for a job and are in real 
need of one but they just can’t find any work. That is 
the reason why employers can make their employees 
work for longer hours even if they aren’t happy with 
it” (interview with a skilled labourer of a medium- 
sized construction company in Kabul, 2016).
Payment and skills upgrading
Most of the labourers interviewed complain that 
their wages do not suffice for their family expenses, 
as the following example illustrates: “This salary is 
not enough for my home expenses but I am coping” 
(interview with a skilled labourer of a medium-sized 
construction company in Kabul, 2016).
The situation has deteriorated in the past few 
years. Many labourers described the trend in the fol-
lowing terms: 
I used to do the same work five or six years ago and 
they used to pay me around AFN 30,000 per month. 
Currently, I am paid just AFN 15,000 per month for 
the same job. When we ask the company for a higher 
salary, they promise to increase it when they have 
more projects (interview with a skilled labourer of a 
medium-sized construction company in Kabul, 2016). 
Methods of payment vary. Whereas some labourers 
are paid on a monthly or daily basis, others are paid a 
piece rate, i.e. according to the quantity of work com-
pleted. In other cases, some parts of a construction 
assignment are outsourced to a third party. In this 
case, the company will not interfere in how the 
sub-contractor pays its labourers.  
“Some of them are paid by the company on monthly 
basis and others are paid by the owners of the ma-
chinery, such as caterpillars and others, who work for 
the company. We have given the contract of asphalt 
levelling to a subcontractor and we don’t get involved 
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EMPLOYMENT IN AFGHAN CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT COMPANIES \ E. GRAWERT & F. SHIRZAD
40 \ \ WORKING PAPER 5  \ 2017
A few employees said they did feel safe working 
for construction companies despite of the security 
threats. They believe that it is less risky to work for 
construction companies than for the government. 
They believe that construction companies are less 
prone to attacks from NSAGs compared to the govern-
ment. One of those stated: “My work experience helps 
me a lot, so I’m very comfortable on the job” (inter-
view with a skilled labourer of a construction company 
in Kabul, 2016). 
Some labourers think that companies are less 
concerned about their safety than about looking after 
their plant and equipment, and others believe that 
companies are not able to protect the staff, as in the 
following case: “I don’t think the company can do any- 
thing for our own safety; it is all the responsibility of 
the government to maintain the security of people 
and the private sector” (interview with an employee 
of a large construction company in Kabul, 2016). 
Others blame the government for not being able 
to provide security and protection for employees.
The field research findings indicate that the em-
ployment conditions in construction companies are 
far below the most basic ILO requirements for decent 
work such as security in the workplace, social protec-
tion for families, and prospects for personal develop-
ment (ILO, 2016). Recruitment of labour favours family 
and kinship members, which can be explained by the 
necessity for trust-based relationships after the expe-
rience of decades of armed conflict, but also by the 
prevalence of patronage systems in Afghan society. 
The companies have adjusted to the declining profit-
ability of construction business by reducing wages 
and making redundancies. In order to cope with the 
context of violence, some firms hire their security 
guards and unskilled building labourers locally from 
the communities in order to gain protection. This 
means that construction projects are, to some extent, 
integrated into local communities and local labour 
markets.
“We do train our staff. We train labourers, we train 
procurement department staff; in fact, we train almost 
all our employees” (interview with an administrative 
officer of a large construction company in Kabul, 2016). 
And an officer from a medium-sized construction 
company said, “We sometimes train our staff because 
it makes our own job easier” (interview in Kabul, 2016).
As labourers tend to work for a company only for 
a short time and then leave, companies do not benefit 
from training them and therefore do not do it. Some 
companies train only the supervisors to ensure they 
will strictly supervise how labourers do their work 
and provide instructions accordingly.
Working in FCASs
Insecurity is a concern not only for employees 
but also for their families. People are worried about 
their physical security not only on the construction 
site but also at the office or while commuting to work. 
When I leave home for the office, my entire family is 
concerned about me. They advise me to come straight 
home after leaving the office” (interview with an  
administration officer of a construction company in 
Kabul, 2016).
In some circumstances, employees will accept 
the risk of working in insecure areas only if they are 
paid higher than normal. “I will go to the site if the 
salary is high enough. Otherwise, I will not go” (inter-
view with an administrative officer of a construction 
company in Kabul, 2016).
Some companies have security divisions respon-
sible for protecting employees and the company’s 
machinery. 
This company has its own separate security depart-
ment; Commander Delawar is the head of the  
department. They have their own security guards and 
they take care of security-related issues. … most of 
the time, we make contacts with Taliban trough local 
residents and we give them a specific amount of 
money so that we can work there. Otherwise we 
wouldn’t be able to work there for a single day (inter-
view with an employee of a large construction com-
pany in Kabul, 2016).
CONFLICT-SENSITIV EMPLOYMENT IN AFGHAN CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT COMPANIES \ E. GRAWERT & F. SHIRZAD 
41 \ \ WORKING PAPER 5  \ 2017
of origin to the company depot. The manager deter-
mines the number of trucks needed for an order and 
the route to be taken, solves problems related to docu-
ments for drivers and trucks, and always has to keep 
track of where the company’s trucks are travelling 
and what goods and volumes are loaded. He also has 
to find solutions for all kinds of incidences on the 
way. Thirty skilled mechanics do the truck mainte-
nance, managed by a workshop supervisor (interview 
with head of mechanics section of a large transport 
company, Herat, 2016). The company has several depots 
and employs an overseer for each. The latter manages 
or commissions any building work required for a 
compound, liaises with contractors, monitors the 
construction work, and supervises all workers em-
ployed on the site, including drivers, guards, labourers, 
cooks, and daily labourers. Moreover, the company 
employs labourers for facility maintenance, techni-
cians for machine maintenance, and workers for filling 
tanks, loading and unloading. As far as possible, the 
company hires daily labourers from the local com-
munities according to the skills available and for un-
skilled work (interviews with a site manager and a 
compound supervisor of a large transport company, 
Herat and Kabul, April 2016). Armed security guards 
are hired to protect the sites and bodyguards take 
care of the company owners and managers, especially 
when they move between sites or outside Herat (ob-
servation in Herat, 2016).
In small companies, the professional roles are  
often very varied and are much less specified. The fol-
lowing interview comprehensively illustrates the 
labour conditions in an SME. 
I work as the marketing officer for this company and 
have a very wide range of responsibilities in the com-
pany. I am in charge of selling and also in charge of 
financial matters. Sometimes I even have to keep 
contact with the drivers and supervise them, so I  
really don’t know my real position in this company. 
Though initially I was hired as finance officer, later I 
realized that I have to do anything that they want … 
I am not really happy about my job for the reasons I 
just told you. But I’m married and have three children, 
so I have to take care of their financial needs and 
that is why I never say anything to my boss. I work 
Employment strategies of transport 
companies
Most employees in transport companies do not 
have permanent contracts. The size of a company is 
the key factor determining whether they employ 
managers, administrative staff, site supervisors, logis-
tics and marketing officers, drivers and assistant driv-
ers, or even run their own mechanics section. The 
bulk of transport companies, however, are informal 
SMEs. Often they are just a one-man business with 
the truck or bus owner offering his services as a driver 
and carrier to individual clients or they may be com-
panies owning several trucks and employing drivers 
or leasing out trucks to one-man hauliers who will 
then carry commodities for the company. Unskilled 
labour, which is mainly used for loading and unloading 
trucks, is hired by transport company owners on the 
spot or through sub-contractors.
Truck drivers need some mechanical knowledge 
and skills and have contacts with workshops on their 
routes in order to handle incidences requiring on-
the-road repairs. Drivers also need to know which 
documents are required for smooth shipment. If a 
transport company has its own mechanics section, 
the drivers will stay in close contact with the head of 
the section, who regularly receives details of any 
maintenance problems from the drivers. The trucks 
are passed on to mechanics with the list of work to be 
done. Finally the repaired trucks are tested according 
to the check list. The head of the mechanics section 
also monitors the driving habits of the company’s 
drivers in order to avoid accidents. Moreover, the 
company’s own mechanics section maintains close 
connections with certain repair shops along the 
routes.
The example of a large transport company with 
head office in Herat clarifies the employment struc-
tures and the range of employees required for opera-
tions that extend all over the country. In this company, 
the manager of the mechanics section is in charge of 
the trucks and drivers. He is responsible for buying 
trucks, checking their condition, finding and employ-
ing drivers, settling the wages for drivers, and super-
vising the transportation of trucks from the country 
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EMPLOYMENT IN AFGHAN CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT COMPANIES \ E. GRAWERT & F. SHIRZAD
42 \ \ WORKING PAPER 5  \ 2017
head of mechanics section of a large transport com-
pany, Herat, 2016). 
In small transport companies, having the right 
relationships is even more important. As a logistics 
officer employed to supply workplace meals in Kabul 
explained: 
The employment situation used to be very good but 
now it is so challenging to find a job. It’s been three 
years that I have been looking for a good job, inside 
an office, not out in the field, but I haven’t been able 
to find one. In current times, if you want to find 
work somewhere, you will only be able to get it if you 
already know someone at the work place (interview, 
2016). 
It was indeed through acquaintances that the 
man finally found his job. The statement also indicates 
the desire for an office job, which is commonly valued 
higher than manual jobs.
Payment, working time and skills upgrading
For employees in company offices, sites, and me-
chanics, the salary usually consists of a package that 
includes monthly payment, transport from home to 
work and back, and lunch. Companies in the sample 
did not insure their employees, nor did employees 
have any own insurance. The overseer of the mechan-
ics section, for example, earned US $1,000 per month 
in 2016. He had a company car and his telephone ex-
penses were covered by the company. Employees in 
less responsible positions were paid in AFN. A com-
pound overseer who worked for ten hours per day  
received on average AFN 15,000 (about US $220) per 
month in 2016; before the crisis, the going rate used 
to be AFN 20,000 (about US $365) per month. Mechan-
ics received a low regular monthly salary but had an 
incentive payment for each repair, ranging from AFN 
40–50,000 (US $580–730) up to US $2,000. These benefits 
are an incentive to work overtime, which many staff 
members regularly do. Assistant mechanics earned at 
least AFN 3,000 (about US $44) per month. Truck drivers 
earned AFN 12,000 (US $175) per month; sometimes 
they worked very long hours, going out and coming 
back within one day (interviews with employees of 
large transport company in Herat, 2016).
from 6:00 in the morning to 7:00 or 8:00 in the 
evening; I have to come early in the morning and sell 
the tickets, and then I have to do my calculations in 
the office and, after that, submit a daily report to the 
owner. And then in the afternoons, the vehicles return 
and I have to go with them to put fuel in the vehicles 
and pay the drivers. I also compile charts and other 
things related to the salaries of the company’s em-
ployees. These are the financial tasks that I do but, 
besides this work, there’s a lot more I do. Sometimes 
I even go to the workshop to repair the vehicles and 
stay there for the whole day, although initially my 
employer told me that I would never travel in this job. 
However, later I realized that I do have to travel 
sometimes, I have accompanied the vehicles to eastern 
and southern provinces, I mean in Afghanistan. You 
have to do manual work, if you are educated or not. 
That doesn’t matter; what matters is to work and 
work and work (interview with an employee in a 
small transport company in Kabul, 2016). 
Whereas large companies invest in the company’s 
organization and have a clear division of responsibili-
ties with specialists deployed on certain task, the 
SMEs do not generally specify job descriptions, as 
their employees have to take on numerous responsi-
bilities and handle situations as they occur.
Recruitment
Recruitment mainly takes place through family 
references. If an employee is needed for tasks for 
which there are no immediate contacts with the 
right skills, recruitment will be primarily based on 
recommendations of relatives or friends. In large 
companies, however, there may be a kind of headhunt- 
ing procedure to recruit skilled mechanics, with good 
working conditions and payment being offered to 
those with good reputation in order to attract them 
away from their current employers. With regard to 
drivers, there is a preference for recruiting young per-
sons because they tend to show more commitment 
and readiness to learn. Moreover, they usually work 
harder, often willing to go out and come back within 
one day in situations where older drivers would re-
fuse to do so. Inquiries are commonly made to previ-
ous employers about a drivers’ record (interview with 
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employees offered to take over a position at a higher 
level for the same salary, hoping to be eligible for a 
higher salary later when they had proved their abili-
ties. Some employees in leading positions improved 
their skills by studying alongside their job (interviews 
with employees in large transport company, Herat, 
2015 and 2016).
The responses reveal that employees are strongly 
attached to ‘their’ company. Reasons are mixed, rang-
ing from the risk of becoming unemployed under the 
harsh economic conditions through to commitment 
and interest in the work and voluntary skills upgrading. 
An employee in a transport company in Kabul sum-
marized his predicament: “If you don’t have links, 
money and relatives, then it will be very certain that 
you will remain jobless in Afghanistan” (interview, 
2015). 
Training on-the-job is the main way of upgrading 
skills, not only in SMEs but even in large transport 
companies. For example, a driver is usually accompa-
nied by an assistant driver, who can be considered as 
an informal apprentice and will gradually take over 
parts of the tours after acquiring a driving license, 
until he can get a job as a driver. Most interview part-
ners confirmed that no formal training was supplied 
by companies; however, skilled employees often train 
younger persons and technical staff under their su-
pervision. The lack of appropriate vocational training 
systems in Afghanistan was mentioned as one of the 
reasons for this practice. 
A large transport company in Herat has intro-
duced a strategy of skills upgrading by getting every 
new employee to start as an assistant driver in order 
to gain practical experience in the haulage business 
and some basic mechanical skills. For the company 
owners, this is a kind of ‘probation’ during which 
they have the opportunity to get to know their new 
people. Some of the staff went on to build careers in 
various sectors of the company, whereas others con-
tinued to work as truck drivers. This approach means 
that everyone in the company has practical and 
hands-on experience of transportation. The explana-
tion given for this practice is quite clear: “Without a 
good education system in place, businessmen have 
developed their own ways.” 
Working time exceeding ten hours per day is 
common in Afghanistan. A logistics officer reported 
that he started work every morning at 6:00 and left at 
7:00 in the evening. However, he said he was content 
to be able to return home every evening from work 
on his motorbike and he did receive a little extra 
money per day for petrol and food (interview in Kabul, 
October 2016). Some drivers never get a day off and 
even have to work during public holidays. They con-
sider taking a leave as ‘escaping’, because they do not 
ask for permission to briefly visit home (interview in 
Kabul, 2016). Like many other workers at transport 
and construction companies with small or medium 
staffing levels, these men were not able to fully care 
for their families’ needs, but they still were glad to be 
earning at least some income.
It is common for company owners to discuss 
complaints personally with their employees and ex-
plain the reasons for their decisions. In 2015 and 2016, 
such explanations were often required as companies 
began reducing salaries and wages in response to the 
economic crisis. In order to maintain those staff com-
pany managers rely on, they may consider the needs 
of an employee. For example, they may plan route 
deployment in a way that allows drivers with families 
to not be absent for a long time, while getting unmar-
ried drivers to take over the longer tours. Nevertheless, 
in order to cope with the economic crisis, larger com-
panies laid off many employees in order to be able to 
retain those drivers who had already worked for the 
company for a longer period. The company reduced 
their payment but kept the core staff even through 
times when there was no work. In 2014 and 2015, sala-
ries and wages were reduced by 25 per cent on average, 
while the number of trucks on the road was cut by up 
to 70 per cent (focus group discussion with owners of 
transport companies in Herat, 2015). Employees prefer 
to meet their superiors or the company owners in 
person when they have complaints. Many interview 
partners reported to have complained about the re-
duction of salaries and wages and informed the head 
of the company openly about their needs. They also 
discussed their career expectations, for example,  
being promoted from compound overseer to technical 
manager. In the face of the economic problems, some 
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our truck drivers or people in sensitive positions 
(interview with a transport company owner in Kabul, 
2016).  
In some cases, the drivers will make deals for re-
pairs on the way in return for cheap goods supplied 
by the company (head of mechanics section in large 
transport company, Herat, 2016). This is a trust-building 
measure towards the communities along the compa-
ny’s transport route. Further security measures in-
volve driving times and the choice of routes, as in the 
following case: 
Every day, between five and sixty company trucks are 
on the routes. We do not have a particular security 
strategy, except to request the drivers to drive during 
daylight and avoid dangerous routes. The Farah road 
150 km south-south-east of Herat is most dangerous” 
(interview, Herat, 2016). 
The owner of a small transport company in Kabul 
stated: 
We don’t have a specific strategy, but we know some 
Arbakees [voluntary community police] and whenever 
our truck or bus is on the move, we ask them to pro-
tect, as far as possible, our vehicles (interview, 2016). 
Company owners, managers and department 
heads do, therefore, apply certain precautions to cope 
with insecurity along transport routes, the core of 
which is building relationships with people along 
the road who can help to protect the trucks.
Hiring unskilled day labourers from local commu- 
nities for simple work, such as constructing walls 
around compounds or as security guards, is another 
community-oriented security strategy pursued by 
companies. If local inhabitants are employed, company 
equipment and vehicles will not be damaged and 
staff members will face less risk of being attacked 
(owners and managers of three transport companies 
in Kabul and Herat, 2015 and 2016).
For transport companies, the conditions in FCASs 
are insecure not only in terms of the risk of armed  
attacks on the road but also in terms of unexpected 
payments of bribes and protection money as well as 
the more systematic corruption. Several drivers re-
ported that problems occur due to the habit of issuing 
truck licenses written by hand. This form of 
To meet the new technological challenges of truck 
repair and maintenance, the company management 
sent one mechanic for training in mechatronics to 
Iran. The employee was then able to take over special 
repair tasks and, as far as possible, trained others on 
the job (interview with head of mechanics section of 
a large transport company, Herat, 2016). Company 
owners, too, expressed some harsh criticism of the 
government’s failure to improve the quality of the l 
abour force. They complained about the lack of a good 
education system that could produce the necessary 
skills and supply the technicians needed in the 
transport sector. One company owner said: “Improve-
ment for employees will only come from a healthy 
government and a healthy people. When I see the 
people, I want to cry” (interview in Herat, 2015). 
It seems that a narrow labour market and the 
tight family networks are forcing employees and 
workers to accept poor working conditions in order 
to avoid unemployment.
Working in FCASs
Employment-related company strategies in the 
context of FCASs involve close cooperation between 
the heads of departments and the staff. Running its 
own mechanics section is part of a company strategy 
to avoid sub-contractors. This has economic reasons, 
such as saving costs, but is also explained by the ad-
vantages of having direct control over the staff and 
building trust. An example reveals the potential mag-
nitude of the losses company owners try to avoid by 
employing trusted people: 
We mostly hire our relatives and people whom we 
know. The reason is that we have invested a lot of 
money in this business, and we cannot trust outsiders 
in our business. We can only trust our near and dear 
ones. Some years ago, we had hired a driver to drive 
one of our trucks, he worked for a month or two in 
our company and then we sent him to transport 
goods to Kunar province. On the way we lost contact 
with him, and after a while we found out that he had 
sold the vehicle at a very cheap price and run away to 
Pakistan. We lost a lot of money in that incident, so 
that shows why we need to be cautious when hiring 
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documentation enhances the possibility that mis-
takes are made in the data regarding the number 
plate, operating permission, engine number, maximum 
load, date and document number, and the amount 
paid for the license. When a driver shows a hand- 
written license to the police at checkpoints, they will 
find mistakes or claim that the handwriting on the 
license is not legible. Officers often accuse drivers of 
having incomplete documents or create other com-
plications. When bribes are paid, the driver is quickly 
given clearance. This problem encourages many haul-
iers to travel without a license and pay at every check- 
point. It provides an extra income for police officers, 
and drivers prefer to pay because the police will not 
delay them and search for things for which they can 
demand payment. Another common way in which 
government officers cheat is to provide the driver 
with a copy of the receipt for the higher fees required 
for big trucks and then enter a lower amount on the 
officer’s copy. The difference pocketed by the officer 
can be about AFN 6,000 (US $87). Company staff sug-
gested digitalizing these procedures in order to avoid 
this type of fraud (interviews with employees of a 
large transport company, Herat, 2016).
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to some work and may be kept at the company during 
times of economic hardship.
The research findings also show that, in the con-
text of rising violence, a shrinking economy and the 
lack of justice and rule of law across Afghanistan, 
construction and transport companies seek their 
own ways of doing business and securing a profit. 
Small companies pursue hardly any particular strategy 
inasmuch as they do not need to approach communi-
ties in risky contexts from outside but are insiders, 
providing small-scale transport services or working 
on locally integrated construction projects as a part 
of local networks, whether inside or outside govern-
ment-controlled areas. Large companies, however,  
often have to deal with communities as outsiders. 
They need safe access and passage or require permis-
sion from the local powerholders. The research revealed 
that in order to make business as profitable as possible 
in the context of an FCAS they apply a range of strate-
gies, as follows: 
Conflict-avoiding strategies to cope with volatilities in 
demand and the lack of training facilities:
   \ retaining a reliable core team, even if on lower 
pay, even at times without work, while laying 
off those less closely related to the company 
owners and managers as the first response;
   \ reducing salaries, wages and benefits rather 
than laying off employees and workers; and 
selling off or leasing out vehicles and other 
assets;
   \ listening to workers’ complaints and explain-
ing the reasons for decisions such as pay cuts; 
   \ providing on-the-job training to upgrade skills 
and—only occasionally—funding training 
abroad for specific skill requirements:
   \ forming joint ventures with other companies 
in order to overcome the constraints of the 
high up-front investments demanded when 
engaging in a large-scale construction contract.
Strategies to avoiding attacks by NSAGs and acts of 
sabotage, kidnapping or attacks by militants from a local 
community:
   \ using local workers and employees as far as 
possible (benefitting from returnees trained 
abroad), thus reducing the number of foreign 
labour force;
An important insight gained from the interviews 
with owners, managers and employees of construction 
and transport companies is that the prevailing per-
ception of insecurity does not only refer to attacks by 
NSAGs and direct violence but, at least to the same 
extent, to the arbitrary extraction of payments by 
government officers, which create unexpected and 
unpredictable costs for companies. The broad concept 
of an FCAS clearly covers this range of uncertainties, 
as it includes not only the occurrence of armed fighting, 
land mines, physical attacks, kidnapping and other 
types of violence, but also the general mistrust of 
people who do not belong to one’s own network, of 
the state and government, and of its executing officers. 
Construction and transport companies thus operate 
in an environment where competition is distorted in 
several ways. The need to favour trusted persons as 
employees, sub-contractors, and business partners 
sidelines those who stand outside the network but 
might have the required skills. Construction sites and 
transport routes in insecure areas either require extra 
investment in security guards or the special skills 
and knowledge needed for coping with those individ-
uals or groups who control these areas. These are  
issues that pose non-economic obstacles for business. 
Economic considerations such as the need for fast  
delivery of goods encourage corruption among state 
officials because shipping commodities without doc-
uments and paying bribes immediately accelerates 
control procedures, which is certainly in the interest 
of a competitive company. Despite the difficult envi-
ronment, companies do compete, each trying to meet 
demand and supply services and goods as efficiently 
and cost-effectively as possible. Since labour laws are 
not enforced, companies adjust their employment  
arrangements in line with the market and thus seek 
to remain economically viable. This explains the high 
frequency of insecure and short-term jobs, unregulated 
payment and working hours, and the lack of formal 
training to ensure skills upgrading. The common ten-
dency to employ family members enhances the infor-
mality of labour relations and contributes to toler-
ance of low payment and unpaid overtime among 
workers. On the other hand, these members of a kin-
ship network also benefit as they at least have access 
Assessment of conflict-sensitivity
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helps to avoid conflicts with employees and provides 
Afghans with an income, enabling them to survive in 
times of economic hardship and saving them from 
having to search for other options. This strategy is 
driven by self-interest, as companies need to operate 
with reliable staff. 
Connected to this is the practice of preferably 
employing family members. Although this excludes 
equally or better skilled people from jobs, there has been 
no indication in the field research that the practice 
has enhanced or reduced armed conflict. The rationale 
for the family-focused employment strategy in FCASs 
is the same as above, again driven by the same interest 
in operating with staff that company owners have 
under their control.  
Training appears to be an issue that companies 
handle without any strategy, simply acting pragmati-
cally to meet temporary needs. The only exception we 
identified was a large transport company in Herat 
which deliberately puts every new employee on a 
career path that starts with an induction as an assis-
tant driver to ensure that everyone has hands-on  
experience in the core work of the transport business 
before specializing in any other role. This is a 
trust-building strategy and enhances respect among 
the whole team. On-the-job training is partly a re-
quirement stemming from the lack of vocational 
training institutions in Afghanistan, and partly it is 
simply a cost-saving practice. In a context of FCASs 
with low performance of state institutions including 
education and training facilities, the private sector is 
left to its own devices. This may not have any imme-
diately visible conflict-enhancing repercussions. 
However, from a broader perspective, it can make it 
harder for employees and workers to find new jobs or 
establish their own companies. They would have bet-
ter prospects if they had structured opportunities to 
improve their skills and professional experience 
while working for construction and transport compa-
nies. Such skills are very likely to reduce the attraction 
of engaging in armed conflicts or working as security 
guards, options that only enhance arms-related 
knowledge and provide little prospect of income 
   \ hiring security staff from the local communities 
where the companies happen to be operating;
   \ hiring unskilled labour from communities 
around the project sites; 
   \ building clinics, schools or mosques in order to 
gain the consent of local communities to con-
struction projects in their area;
   \ switching to a different kind of client (less in-
ternationals and more locals within Afghanistan, 
or realigning the company to projects abroad),
   \ focusing on different sites or routes in Afghan-
istan that appear to be more accessible and less 
threatened by NSAGs,
   \ negotiating access and passage with local power- 
holders, including ‘tax’ payments to Taliban.
The above and similar measures are strategies 
driven by the self-interest of profit-oriented, risk- 
avoiding businessmen trying to run companies in 
FCASs. As our next step, we shall now analyse the  
effects of these strategies in terms mitigating or 
worsening violent conflict.
The strategies of keeping core staff in times of 
crisis and employing Afghans are guided by economic 
as well as non-economic context-related considera-
tions. After a set-back, a company will be back on the 
market faster if the core team is still in place. Trust 
and loyalty will grow among employees if they have 
had the experience of the owner taking care of them 
and listening to their complaints. Thus, trust will re-
main strong, but it has its price: employees may not 
be producing a profit, there may be workers with 
higher skills out there and, from the employees’ 
standpoint, employees are suffering temporary pay 
cuts. Loyalty is important for the company owners 
because reliable personnel prevent losses caused by 
employees who would put personal advantages above 
the interests of the company. Moreover, close company 
ties reduce the probability that workers will organize 
themselves and advance their interests collectively 
across an industry. This explains to some extent the 
weakness of trade unions in Afghanistan. In any case, 
keeping core staff is a conflict-reducing strategy  
applied by construction and transport companies. It 
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some of them to apply the conflict-sensitive strategy 
of employing local inhabitants. 
Hiring security personnel from local communities 
may also help to protect a company’s operations if 
there is no local-level group that feels sidelined. Un-
derstanding the local conflict context is the precon-
dition for a temporary conflict-reducing effect of this 
strategy. But if local inhabitants consider the hiring 
policy for security staff to be biased, the effect can be 
to enhance conflict within a discontented community. 
Moreover, the supply of arms to local people carries a 
risk that they will use the power gained from being 
weaponized for personal gain, such as financial ex-
tortion, or for involvement in NSAGs when the job 
has ended, because using arms often remains the 
only skill they have ever acquired (Shirzad, 2016).
In all these cases, the conflict-reducing effects 
tend to be temporary. As long as a company is still at 
work and employs local inhabitants, there may be a 
degree of satisfaction due to the available job oppor-
tunities. When the project ends, it is crucial that the 
established building or infrastructure has a sustaina-
ble advantage for the community and improves living 
conditions even after the local workers have left the 
construction company. Otherwise, the building, road 
or pipeline, etc. is at risk of being destroyed. Moreover, 
negotiations that are limited to the community elders 
and do not involve the local powerholder (directly or 
indirectly through the elders or district development 
assemblies) can also put at risk a project or regular 
transport service in the area. The powerholder may 
not be satisfied with his share of the payment, may 
not benefit from the construction or transport activi-
ties, or may actually lose a source of his revenue (as in 
the case of the bridge fees paid by nomads). This 
would cause an escalation of conflict.
Further security-related strategies pursued by 
companies involve avoidance of risky areas and 
routes. They may reduce opportunities for profit but 
can allow a company to continue at an acceptable 
level. As large projects in Afghanistan always include 
work in risky parts of the country (in terms of infra-
structure projects as well as transportation), some 
companies have formed joint ventures or involve 
generation in peaceful environments. Indirectly, the 
lack of skills and formal training opportunities can 
thus have a conflict-enhancing impact. 
This assessment was shared by the head of de-
partment at the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, 
Martyrs and the Disabled in Herat, who maintained 
that where vocational training centers have operated, 
graduates found opportunities for self-employment 
in masonry, carpentry, plumbing, etc. (interview, 2015). 
The head of department at the Ministry for Rural  
Rehabilitation and Development in Herat stated that 
due to the increased unemployment in the rural areas, 
more people had moved to the cities, leading to high-
er levels of ‘criminality’ (interview, 2015). Hence, 
training not only of the core employees but also of  
locally hired workers on construction sites could 
have a conflict-reducing effect, because they might 
find opportunities to use their newly acquired skills 
locally as self-employed or employed semi-skilled 
workers. Moreover, closer involvement of local workers 
in construction projects has the potential to open the 
close family or kinship employment networks to new 
people and thus, gradually change labour relations. 
Employing local inhabitants at construction proj- 
ect sites, using community-based workshops, restau-
rants and hotels along transport routes, and providing 
services and buildings to communities are all strate-
gies that reduce conflict between companies and 
communities. Communities across Afghanistan have 
to make a living under widely varying conditions, 
within diverse local power relations and in the face of 
different scales of economic crisis. In most commu-
nities, income opportunities are urgently needed, so 
that a company that ignores this need can face resist-
ance and acts of sabotage or even kidnapping at-
tempts aiming to force the company to distribute the 
expected benefits to the community. Hence, those 
companies that have the skills to negotiate with the 
relevant persons –requiring an understanding of the 
local conflict context – will be likely to establish con-
struction sites or transport routes in the vicinity of 
these communities without being attacked. In other 
words, the interest of companies in protecting facili-
ties, vehicles and staff from attacks is what drives 
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contractors.  Sharing and delegating can help to over-
come obstacles posed by insecurity and by the re-
quirement to make high up-front payments to clients. 
The rationale is that local companies take charge of 
parts of a large infrastructure project in those areas 
where they have the relevant connections to power-
holders, and leave other sections to other companies. 
Transport companies achieve the same effect by em-
ploying different drivers for different sections of the 
route, such as a Herati driver for the first part, then 
another, possibly a Pashtun, depending on the pre-
vailing ethnicity. This appears to be a viable conflict- 
reducing strategy with wider employment effects for 
large-scale infrastructure projects and overland 
transportation.
Payment of ‘taxes’ to powerholders and Taliban 
by companies is an important source of income for 
NSAGs. The effect is to consolidate the patterns of 
control, with some areas under control of NSAGs and 
others under control of the government, while a 
number of areas are violently contested. In the same 
way, paying the bribes demanded government officials, 
which often exceed the payments required by the  
Taliban (Shirzad, 2016), contributes to stabilizing 
these practices. Private companies are thus unlikely 
to change the local context in a peaceful direction, let 
alone contribute to a sustainable peace.
The findings suggest that private companies can 
have a meaningful impact on local stability if they 
apply conflict-sensitive employment strategies and 
neither exacerbate violence nor deepen divisions 
within a community or between communities. How-
ever, this kind of stability will not have any normative 
content but just keep the existing local power rela-
tions and social cohesion as they are, be it in govern-
ment-held or in NSAG-held parts of Afghanistan. 
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EMPLOYMENT IN AFGHAN CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT COMPANIES \ E. GRAWERT & F. SHIRZAD
50 \ \ WORKING PAPER 5  \ 2017
cohesion. Ideally, conflict-sensitive employment also 
requires compliance with the ILO standards for de-
cent work.
The study shows that Afghan companies are far 
from offering decent work. The huge skills and educa-
tion gap in Afghanistan will take a long time to be 
closed. Although vocational training projects do exist, 
especially for youths (GIZ, 2015), only 52 per cent of 
the population are above the working age of 14 (ILO, 
2014), and only 19 per cent of working age females are 
active in the labour market (World Bank, 2014, p. 33), 
especially since cultural attitudes toward women  
remain largely conservative. In the CIT sector in  
Afghanistan, women are rarely employed, even in  
offices. Opportunities for work that is productive and 
delivers a fair income are very rare, especially after 
the rapid increase of the unemployment rate in Af-
ghanistan in 2015 and 2016. Security in the workplace 
and social protection for families are limited, but for 
those employed as core staff in larger construction 
and transport companies there are some informal  
arrangements. Prospects for personal development 
and social integration are available for this group of 
employees, however, often connected with family and 
kinship ties that extend into the company. Freedom 
for people to express their concerns and to organize 
and participate in the decisions at work that affect 
their lives also exists within close personal networks 
and within a few companies with a deliberate strategy 
to enhance staff loyalty, but it is not found across or 
beyond sectors outside personalized networks. This 
reflects the general social patterns in Afghanistan 
and will not change in the short term. 
International agencies strongly reject any policy 
of hiring only workers whom employers trust, as they 
consider this as nepotism (Cusack & Malmstrom, 
2010; Pain & Mallet, 2014) and hold that the manner 
in which jobs are distributed affects the aspirations 
and expectations of people and influences whether 
people believe that they hold a stake in their society. 
They view employment based on merit as contributing 
to the integration of those who feel disenfranchised 
and see formal employment as unobtainable (World 
Bank, 2012). However, as our research in Afghanistan 
reveals, the conditions of an FCAS enhance the 
The Paper has addressed the questions of how 
construction and transport companies avoid losses 
through violent attacks and manage to continue  
doing profitable business in FCASs. The research has 
shown that, in an FCAS, companies are or become 
part of a political marketplace. This marketplace is 
shaped by the politics of foreign intervention, where 
companies supply services to troops, and by local 
power politics, where they have to negotiate with  
local powerholders for safe completion of construction 
projects or safe passage of trucks. Entrepreneurs and 
employees belonging to a private company will never 
be perceived as neutral by local communities in 
FCASs. Hence, those companies that successfully do 
business in Afghanistan are those that engage with 
the local leaders, with corrupt government officers 
and NSAGs in a deliberate and strategic way.
Conflict sensitivity has been defined as the ability 
of a company, investor, donor or any other organization 
to understand the context it operates in, understand 
the interaction between its intervention and that 
context, and act upon this understanding in order to 
minimize negative impacts and maximize positive 
impacts on conflict. This implies taking steps to avoid 
reinforcing existing conflict dynamics and to take 
opportunities to support peaceful social interaction. 
Related to this, conflict-sensitive employment calls 
for employment practices that do not cause or exac-
erbate conflict. Employers, but also the government 
and powerholders in control of areas and communities, 
can foster or obstruct such practices. In an FCAS, the 
self-governance systems and local orders emanating 
from non-state social and economic institutions are a 
given structure and framework of equal importance 
to state structures (which are often entangled with 
these ‘informal’ structures anyway) when it comes to 
negotiating conflict-sensitive private-sector develop-
ment and employment approaches. Concretely, conflict- 
sensitive employment implies job creation, and in 
particular job creation that is meaningful in the 
sense that individuals or communities consider the 
jobs as providing real prospects for the future. Moreo-
ver, conflict sensitivity involves inclusive employ-
ment that avoids divisive effects and promotes 
Conclusion
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practice of making trust a crucial basis for employ-
ment decisions. So this makes ‘nepotism’ a rational 
strategy. Hiring foreign workers instead of Afghans, 
both for the sake of acquiring skilled workers and im-
proving security, can fuel conflicts under the condi-
tions of high unemployment and in a culture of net-
works and informal connections.
Contrary to assumptions in the literature, our  
research finds that SMEs do not seem to be the main 
driving forces towards conflict-sensitive employment, 
because they are already integrated in communities, 
certainly form part of, or at least have an arrangement 
with, the locally existing power networks and, more-
over, do not offer any large-scale employment. The 
survey findings reveal that some of the larger, formally 
registered companies in Afghanistan do apply conflict- 
sensitive employment strategies. Strategies are driven 
by self-interest and the profit motive and adapted to 
the context of an FCAS. Conflict-sensitive employment 
is, moreover, a difficult endeavour, which requires in-
depth and long-term experience in operating in a 
business environment characterized by the risk of  
violent attacks and corrupt practices of government 
officials, so the extent to which Afghan companies 
apply conflict-sensitive employment strategies will 
vary. New companies can learn from old-established 
ones, and companies suffering from the withdrawal 
of foreign clients since 2013 can adopt strategies from 
these companies in order to survive the economic 
crisis. If new large-scale investments are to be made 
in Afghanistan, foreign companies will need to con-
sult with experienced Afghan construction and 
transport companies in order to make their projects a 
success. 
The most sobering finding of the research is that 
private construction and transport companies, as 
temporary actors in communities, may apply con-
flict-sensitive employment strategies but will not be 
able to assume a role in peacebuilding. They may sta-
bilize local power relations as they are, but this 
means contributing to the persistence of state cor-
ruption or ‘tax’ payments to Taliban and other power-
holders controlling a particular territory. No evidence 
was found of companies having a direct impact on 
peacebuilding in Afghanistan.
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ILO International Classification of 
Status in Employment (ICSE-93)
The Resolution concerning the International 
Classification of Status in Employment (ICSE), which 
forms the basis of operation of the International  
Labour Organization (ILO), specifies the groups in 
employment according to the ICSE-93 as follows:
1. Employees, who get a basic remuneration not di-
rectly dependent [on] the revenue of the employer  
- among whom countries may need and be able to dis-
tinguish ‘employees with stable contracts’ (including 
‘regular employees’);
2. Employers, who hold self-employment jobs (i.e. 
whose remuneration depends directly on the (expec-
tation of) profits derived from the goods and services 
produced) and engage one or more person to work for 
them as ‘employees’, on a continuous basis;
3. Own-account workers, who hold self-employment 
jobs and do not engage ‘employees’ on a continuous 
basis;
4. Members of producers‘ cooperatives, who hold 
self-employment jobs in a c[o]operative producing 
goods and services, where the members take part on 
an equal footing in making major decisions concern-
ing the cooperative;
5. Contributing family workers, who hold self-em-
ployment jobs in an establishment operated by a re-
lated person, with a too limited degree of involvement 
in its operation to be considered a partner;
6. Workers not classifiable by status, for whom in-
sufficient relevant information is available, and/or 
who cannot be included in any of the preceding cate-
gories (ILO, 2017).
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACCI Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries ACCI
ADB Asian Development Bank ADB 
AFN Afghan (currency of Afghanistan) AFN
ANP Afghan National Police ANP
ANPDF Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework ANPDF
APPF Afghan Public Protection Force APPF
BES Business Establishment Survey  BES
CSE conflict sensitive employment CSE
CIT  construction, infrastructure and transportation CIT
FCAS fragile and conflict-affected settings FCAS
GDP gross domestic product GDP
IBES Integrated Business Enterprise Survey IBES
ICSE International Classification of Status in Employment ICSE
ILO International Labour Organization ILO
IOM International Organization for Migration IOM
ISAF International Security Assistance Forces ISAF
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification ISIC
ISIL-KP Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant — Khorasan Province ISIL-KP
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Sham ISIS
MoTCA Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation   MoTCA
MP Member of Parliament MP
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO
NGO non-governmental organization NGO
NSAG non-state armed group NSAG
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team PRT
PSD private sector development PSD
SME small and medium enterprises SME
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan UNAMA
UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSC
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